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NEXTWAVE V. FCC: BATrLE FOR THE C-
BLOCK LICENSES
Andrea J. Serlin+
Throughout its history, the U.S. government has held important natu-
ral resources in public trust, primarily to ensure their optimal efficiency
for all citizens! Radio frequency spectrum has been categorized as such
a resource because it is "vitally important to our economic success and
social well-being," yet can accommodate only a limited number of users.2
Thus, in the Communications Act of 1934,3 Congress confirmed that the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) would allo-
cate the radio frequency spectrum. All broadcasting and telecommuni-
cations systems would operate through this system, yet its users would
hold no property rights
In 1993 Congress directed the FCC to issue certain licenses through a
system of competitive bidding carefully designed to promote the effi-
cient, fair, and intensive use of the spectrum.6 The current auction pro-
gram, embodied in the Federal Communications Act (FCA),7 awards li-
censes for specific blocks of frequency according to a competitive bidding
system. s The FCC ultimately approves how and by whom the licenses
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Causey v. United States, 240 U.S. 399, 402 (1916).
2. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 247-48 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 574-
75. In reorganizing allotment of radio spectrum, Congress referred to the purpose behind
government ownership and management of the spectrum. See id. at 247-48.
3. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
4. Id. § 301 (1994).
5. See id.
6. See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 253, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 580. In
1993, Congress amended the Communications Act to include § 309(j). See Omnibus Rec-
onciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002(a), 107 Stat. 312, 387 (1993).
7. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (explaining that the Communications Act
of 1934 was amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The FCC authorizes the auc-
tioning of licenses within spectrums categorized geographically and by frequency. See In
re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 263, 282 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(NextWave I); see also In re FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, 13 F.C.C.R.
9601, 9616-17 (Oct. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Spectrum Report]; In re Implementation of Sec-
tion 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C.R. 2348, 2376, para.
164 (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Second Report and Order]. Prospective licensees apply
for the opportunity to bid and may only participate in the auction if selected by the FCC.
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are used, and it issues them conditionally to ensure the legislative intent
of promoting the public interest.9 But even those businesses licensed by
the government can fail financially, creating a situation where the li-
censes become important factors in bankruptcy proceedings.'"
The United States Bankruptcy Code, in part, promotes equitable dis-
tribution amongst creditors and protection from debtor transactions that
would "deprive creditors of property from which their claims can be sat-
isfied."" Consequently, when the government acts as a creditor, it is also
subject to, for better or worse, bankruptcy laws.' 2 In certain circum-
stances, however, federal law protects government functions from bank-
ruptcy proceedings to advance the public interest."
Although it is not uncommon for FCC licenses to be included in bank-
ruptcy filings, 4 a recent auction has raised new questions regarding the
See id. at 2376-77, paras. 165-68. At the close of the auction, the highest bidder wins the
right to exclusively apply for the licenses for which it bid. See id. at 2383, para. 199. The
FCC will subsequently award licenses to the winning bidder once the application is ap-
proved and a down payment is made. See id.
9. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301,309(h) (1994).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994) (defining property of the bankruptcy estate under
the Bankruptcy Code); see also, e.g., In re Ridgely Communications, Inc., 139 B.R. 374,
376 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) (holding that FCC licenses become property of the estate under
It U.S.C. § 541 when the licensee files for bankruptcy and reiterating that the licenses do
not constitute assets or vested property interests); In re Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d 829, 837
(1983) (holding that FCC licenses have been included as assets in the bankrupt estate).
11. In re Stoecker, 131 B.R. 979, 984 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991); see also In re Giordano,
188 B.R. 84, 88 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1995) (showing that § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
motes the central policy of ensuring that "the equities among creditors ... are respected"
when the estate is distributed); H.R. REP. 95-595, at 1, 178 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138.
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(1)(3), (b) (1994) (providing that governmental units are
subject to § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs avoidance claims, and allowing
the court to issue an order, judgment, or award monetary relief against a governmental
unit); see also, e.g., Anderson v. FDIC, 918 F.2d 1139, 1142 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was subject to a failed bank's bank-
ruptcy protections); FDIC v. Harrison, 735 F.2d 408, 411 (1lth Cir. 1984) (finding that
when the government acts in a proprietary capacity, it acts as a private entity); cf United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1979) (noting that the U.S. govern-
ment is essentially the same as a private lender when certain government entities make
loans).
13. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (exempting the govern-
ment's exercise of police and regulatory powers from certain bankruptcy provisions); see
also infra note 74 and accompanying text (listing several statutory provisions exempting
particular debts owed to the government from standard bankruptcy law protections).
14. See, e.g., LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1146-47 n.2, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ar-
ticulating the FCC's approval process for transfer and subsequent resale of a bankrupt's
broadcast license); see also, e.g., In re TAK Communications, Inc., 985 F.2d 916, 917-18
(7th Cir. 1993) (exemplifying how courts have included licenses as assets in bankruptcy
proceedings). The FCC has accepted the fact that licenses are valuable assets to bankrupt
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role of the Commission and the courts in such proceedings. The largest
companies holding licenses awarded in the 1996 C-Block auction filed for
bankruptcy after failing to meet payment deadlines,'6 and by 1999 four
companies had filed proceedings against the FCC in bankruptcy court
seeking to retain their licenses without having to pay their winning bid
amounts in full. 7
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. (NextWave), which held
the majority of the C-Block licenses at that time, initiated the most publi-S 18
cized bankruptcy case in this auction. NextWave filed a fraudulent con-
license holders and thus, has agreed to license transfers that occur as a result of reorgani-
zation on the stipulation that the parties adhere to the regulatory conditions on the li-
censes. See In re Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d at 837.
15. See infra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the series of cases that acted
as the vehicle for bringing this new issue to the courts).
16. See FCC Releases Official C-Block Election Results; Numbers Still Likely to
Change via Bankruptcy Cases, PCS WEEK, June 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8015944
(announcing that NextWave, Telecom, Inc., Pocket Communications Inc., and General
Wireless, Inc. had all filed for bankruptcy).
17. See In re GWI PCS1, Inc., 245 B.R. 59, 61 (N.D. Tex. 1999); In re Urban Comm-
North Carolina, Inc., Adversary No. 99-8125 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re DCR PCS, Inc.
Adversary No. 98-6223 (Bankr. Md. 1998); In re NextWave Personal Communications,
Inc., 235 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (NextWave I). The FCC has sought to re-
claim C-Block licenses from other bankrupt licensees who defaulted on their installment
payments. See, e.g., In re Kansas Personal Communications Servs., Ltd., No. 99-21747-11-
JAR, 2000 WL 1199798, at *2, *12 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2000); In re Personal Communications
Network, Inc., 249 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000).
18. See NextWave I, 235 B.R. at 263. NextWave's first amended complaint alleged
two claims against the FCC. See id. at 265. The court accepted the first claim of fraudu-
lent conveyance and dismissed the second claim of alleged misconduct by the FCC in
regulating and managing the auction process for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See
id. at 265, 270; see also In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 272, 273-
74, 276 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave II) (finding that the date of company's obliga-
tion to the FCC sufficiently supported a fraudulent conveyance claim); In re NextWave
Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 277, 304 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave
IV.A) (finding that the FCC fraudulently conveyed the C-Block licenses to NextWave be-
cause the value of the licenses did not equal the bid amount); In re NextWave Personal
Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 305, 309 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave IV.B)
(granting NextWave the remedy of avoidance of the debt it owed to the FCC); In re
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 314, 318 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(NextWave V) (denying the. FCC's request to lift the automatic stay and repossess the li-
censes due to non-payment); In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R.
311, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave VI) (affirming the bankruptcy court's decisions and
orders); In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 62 (2d Cir. 1999)
(NextWave VII) (reversing the lower court's finding of a fraudulent conveyance by the
FCC and remedy (allowing avoidance of full payment on the C-Block licenses), and re-
manding for further proceedings), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No.
99-1980); In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 257, 283 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NextWave VIII) (granting NextWave's motion to enforce the automatic
stay and to nullify cancellation of C-Block licenses); In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 129, 141 (2d
Cir. 2000) (NextWave IX), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2000)
2000]
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veyance claim in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court to avoid paying the $4.7 bil-
lion it bid to secure licenses in the 1996 C-Block auction." The company
alleged that the FCC fraudulently conveyed the licenses by requiring
NextWave to pay its winning bid, rather than the value of the licenses at
the time the FCC actually issued the licenses six months after the auc-
• 20
tion. The bankruptcy court, which found that the reasonable value of
the licenses, when issued, amounted to a little more than $1 billion,
agreed and subsequently avoided the remaining $3.7 billion NextWave
owed to the government.
21
FCC regulations automatically cancel licenses unless bidders tender
their winning bid payments in full and on time. 2' The bankruptcy court,
nevertheless, ruled that the licensing transaction was a purely fiscal mat-
ter and that, as a creditor, the FCC was subject to the modification of the
payment amount under the Bankruptcy Code.23 On appeal, however, the
(No. 00-447) (granting FCC's petition for a writ of mandamus and directing the bank-
ruptcy court to lift the automatic stay in compliance with the Second Circuit's December
22,1999 NextWave holding).
19. See NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 265 (upholding the fraudulent conveyance claim). A
fraudulent conveyance claim is a bankruptcy action by which a debtor can obtain relief
from debts that the bankruptcy court determines were invalid at the time they were in-
curred. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548(a)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
20. See NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 269 (alleging that the amount NextWave bid at the
auction should not have to be honored because the licenses were not technically granted
to the company until six months later). The court found that NextWave's obligation to the
FCC commenced on January 3, 1997, the day the FCC awarded the licenses to NextWave,
not when the company won the winning bid at auction in May and July of 1996. See
NextWave 11, 235 B.R. at 273-76.
21. See NextWave IVA, 235 B.R. at 280, 304 (finding that the bid amount did not rea-
sonably reflect the value of the licenses at the time of the auction or at the time the FCC
finally conveyed the licenses to NextWave). Avoidance, a legal remedy under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, allows a bankrupt debtor to avoid paying certain debts. See 11 U.S.C. §§
544(b)(1), 548(a)(1). Throughout the remainder of this Comment, references to the
"NextWave court," the "bankruptcy court," and unless identified otherwise, the "court,"
shall mean the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York, which is the
bankruptcy court that presided over the NextWave cases.
22. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(4) (1999). The regulations governing the payment of
the C-Block licenses directs that the licenses be conditioned "upon the full and timely per-
formance of the licensee's payment obligations under the installment plan." Id. In the
event that a licensee fails to make payments as scheduled, the license will automatically
cancel. See id. § 1.2110(f)(4)(iv).
23. See NextWave I, 235 B.R. at 269; NextWave IV.B, 235 B.R. at 314; NextWave V,
235 B.R. at 316-18; NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 316 (holding that regardless of the Commis-
sion's regulatory role in issuing spectrum licenses, it is nonetheless a creditor when it col-
lects money). All property that is deemed part of a bankrupt estate is automatically
stayed and receives protection from any legal claims of creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(2) (1994); see also infra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing further 11
U.S.C. § 362). The FCC claimed that NextWave's failure to comply with the regulations
warranted relief from the stay "to permit the FCC, in effect, to reclaim the 'cancelled' li-
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that bankruptcy and
district court rulings contravened the FCA and the FCC's regulations,
and held that no fraudulent conveyance had occurred . NextWave then
offered to pay the full amount of its debt, but the FCC declared that the
licenses had already terminated for nonpayment.25 The bankruptcy court
responded by enforcing the automatic stay afforded to NextWave's
bankruptcy estate, which effectively nullified the cancellation of the li-
censes.16 In the May 2000 ruling, the Second Circuit once again struck
down the bankruptcy court's decision, holding that the FCC's actions
were within its mandated role for regulating spectrum licenses, and,
therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court nor any
of the Bankruptcy Code's creditor provisions.27 NextWave subsequently
appealed to the Supreme Court and petitioned both the FCC and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review the
January 12, 2000 Cancellation Order."
censes." NextWave V, 235 B.R. at 316.
24. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 62 (2d Cir.
1999) (NextWave VII) (holding that the bankruptcy court lacked the power to interfere
with the FCC's licensing system because its inherent regulatory role prevented the court
from modifying the amount NextWave was obligated to pay for the licenses), cert. denied,
69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980).
25. See generally Statement from NextWave Telecom: FCC Rejects $4.3 Billion Pay-
ment From NextWave, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 13, 2000 [hereinafter NextWave Statement] (dis-
cussing how NextWave offered to comply with the appellate court's ruling and pay the en-
tire $4.3 billion for its C-Block licenses); FCC Public Notice, FCC Informs Court That
NextWave Licenses Have Cancelled and Sets Date for Auction, Jan. 12, 2000, available in
2000 WL 19244 [hereinafter Cancellation Notice] (declaring publicly that the NextWave
licenses had automatically cancelled under 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110 because payment deadlines
were not met); FCC, Objection of Federal Communication Commission to Debtors' Modi-
fied First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, Jan. 12, 2000, available in 2000 WL 19244
[hereinafter FCC Objection to Modified Plan] (filing an objection in the bankruptcy court
to NextWave's modified reorganization plan because it is premised on the Company's re-
tention of the cancelled licenses). NextWave subsequently petitioned the bankruptcy
court to enforce the automatic stay to prevent the FCC from reclaiming the licenses. See
NextWave Statement, supra; see also Spectrum Auctions, Technology and the Federal
Budget: Hearing Before the Senate Budget Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing] (statement of Raymond P. Dolan, Chief Operating Officer, NextWave Telecom,
Inc.) (testifying that NextWave is entitled to keep the licenses by virtue of its offer to pay
for them in full).
26. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 257-58, 267,
274 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NextWave VIII) (holding that the FCC acted as a creditor by
finding NextWave in default for not paying for the licenses on time and that the cancella-
tion violated the Bankruptcy Code).
27. See In re FCC, 217 B.R. 125, 138-39, 141 (2d Cir. 2000) (NextWave IX), petition
for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2000) (No. 00-447).
28. See Heather Forsgren Weaver, Court Refuses to Stay Re-Auction, Sends Appeal to
FCC, RCR RADIO COMM. REP., July 10, 2000, available in 2000 WL 9541820. Parties may
appeal the FCC's final orders to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
2000]
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This Comment focuses on whether the FCC's regulations governing
spectrum licenses are subject to bankruptcy law in light of the myriad of
issues raised by the NextWave case. Part I outlines the government's role
in spectrum allocation and the provisions governing assets under the
Federal Bankruptcy Code. Part I also details the history of the 1996 C-
Block auction and the NextWave case. Part II examines the statutory and
regulatory purposes of spectrum licensing, the disagreement between the
government and the bankruptcy court regarding the FCC's role as regu-
lator and creditor of the licenses, and the conflict between the congres-
sional purposes behind the Bankruptcy Code and the FCA. Part III as-
sesses the impact of the Second Circuit's rulings on commercial spectrum
licensees, the telecommunications industry, and the regulation of radio
spectrum. This Comment concludes that the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit correctly held that the bankruptcy court lacks the
power to interfere with or attack the FCC's regulatory power through
avoidance remedies or stay provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. The
court found that the FCC's actions furthered a congressional mandate to
ensure efficient and effective use of the radio spectrum for the public in-
terest and, thus, bankruptcy law cannot impede this power.
I. REGULATED RESOURCES IN THE FREE MARKET: PUBLIC INTEREST
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
Property ownership, especially when in the context of natural re-
sources, has played an important role in the history of this country. As
the United States industrialized, however, the need for government
regulation developed to preserve the public's right to enjoy these re-
sources."' Congress therefore precluded the private ownership of natural
resources because they are essential to the public, yet limited in supply.3'
Circuit. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(4) (1994).
29. See Brian C. Fritts, Note, Private Property, Economic Efficiency, and Spectrum
Policy in the Wake of the C Block Auction, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 849, 877-78 (1998) (citing
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 128 (Mark Goldie ed., Guernsey Press
Co. 1996) (1690)). In 1690, John Locke argued that because a person has ownership over
himself, anything taken from nature and combined with his labor should be deemed his
own property. See id.
30. Cf Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 & n.5 (1969) (citing a Con-
gressman's call for governmental regulation of radio frequency by the government in or-
der to preserve the public's right to enjoy this medium of communication).
31. See, e.g., id. at 376-77, 394-95; In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc.,
200 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 1999) (NextWave VII) (analogizing radio spectrum to air space and
territorial waters as examples of natural resources that the government cannot own, buy,
or sell), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980); see also 67
CONG. REC. 5479 (1927) (statement of Rep. White during the enactment of the Radio Act
of 1927). Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt argued that maintaining natural resources
[Vol. 50:219
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Although the private sector's utilization of natural resources may
"maximize[] economic benefits," the government is cautious when it al-
lows personal gain through public property.
32
A. Radio Frequency Spectrum Licenses
Prior to 1927, the private sector managed all non-government use of
radio spectrum frequencies and consequently caused a "cacophony of
competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably
heard."33 Congress resolved that radio spectrum's limited nature and the
public's right to benefit from its use required government control.34 The
Radio Act of 1927 directed the government to grant spectrum licenses
only to those who would serve the public interest, convenience, or neces-
sity.35 The Communications Act of 1934 included a similar requirement
that vested the exclusive control of all spectrum frequencies and licenses
with the FCC.36 Neither the government nor private entities may own
radio spectrum because it constitutes a limited natural resource. 7 There-
fore, a license conveys no property rights, but only the right to use the
spectrum in accordance with the conditions accompanying the license.
Furthermore, no license or any associated rights "shall be transferred, as-
signed, or disposed of" without the express approval of the FCC.38
For many years, the FCC allocated spectrum through comparative
as public property ensured that their benefits were equally accessible to all citizens. See
William L. Fishman, Property Rights, Reliance, and Retroactivity Under the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 5 (1997).
32. Fishman, supra note 31, at 5.
33. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 375,376.
34. Cf id. at 375 n.4, 376 n.5 (noting the series of National Radio Conferences be-
tween 1922 and 1925 and the call for legislation to limit the number of broadcasters in-
fringing upon the public's right to enjoy and benefit from radio communication).
35. See Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163 (1927) (establishing the Fed-
eral Radio Commission and providing it with authority to grant spectrum licenses). The
Communications Act of 1934 created the FCC, which assumed spectrum authority. 47
U.S.C. §§ 151,303 (1994).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (defining the purpose of the Communications Act as en-
suring that the government maintains control of radio spectrum); id. § 303 (authorizing the
FCC to manage radio spectrum to further the public interest); id. § 307 (directing the FCC
to allocate spectrum in furtherance of the public interest).
37. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir.
1999) (NextWave VII), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1994). The Supreme Court confirmed that the Commission
can determine who gets licenses "only within the scope of its licensing power, i.e., to grant
or deny the license on the basis of the situation of the applicant." In re Pacific Land Sales,
Inc., 187 B.R. 302, 311 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Regents of Univ. System of Ga. v.
Carroll, 338 U.S. 586, 602 (1950)). The Ninth Circuit stated: "The public interest, after all,
is in the effective use of the available channels, and only to that extent in what particular
applicant receives a license." Id.
2000]
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hearings, and granted licenses to parties that the Commission determined
would best utilize the spectrum in the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity., 39 The FCC abandoned this process in 1981 because it was
vague and inefficient.
4
These problems led Congress to amend the FCA and create a lottery
system for the allocation of spectrum licenses, which proved to be just as
arbitrary and administratively cumbersome as the hearing method.4'
Any party who paid for an application and met the minimum require-
ments could be eligible for a license because the FCC randomly selected
•42
licensees. This system created a market of speculators, interested only
in turning a profit by reselling the licenses.43 While the spectrum ulti-
mately wound up in the hands of those who valued it most, such specula-
tion significantly affected the market price of the licenses and delayed
service to the public.44 Policymakers were uncomfortable with lottery
39. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a)-(i) (1994 & Supp. Il 1997) (describing the application process
for licenses).
40. See Spectrum Report, supra note 8, at 9609-12 (summarizing the history of the
FCC's spectrum allocation program and proposing recommendations for improvements).
Although the FCC allowed applicants to show why their qualifications surpassed their
competitors', the allocation procedure imposed heavy fiscal and administrative burdens on
the Commission. See id. at 9610. In addition, the procedure sometimes lasted for more
than 20 months, delaying financial opportunities in the market. See id. at 9609.
41. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 736-
737 (1981), amended by, Communications Amendment Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, §
115, 96 Stat. 1094-95 (1982). In 1991, it took over a year to award a license, at a cost to the
Commission of approximately $190 million in administration expenses. See In re Amend-
ment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services,
Proposed, 7 F.C.C.R. 5676, 5699 n.41 (1992). The Commission became so overburdened
with administrative demands that service delays intensified. See Spectrum Report, supra
note 8, at 9610.
42. See Christine E. Enemark, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peha: Forcing the Fed-
eral Communications Commission into a New Constitutional Regime, 30 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBs. 215, 219 (1997) (explaining how the system remained open to anyone who
applied because the Commission could not discriminate against the applicants as long as
they met the application's basic requirements).
43. See Spectrum Report, supra note 8, at 9609-10 (reporting that almost 400,000 firms
claimed to be spectrum "providers," but had no intention of providing services to the pub-
lic). The rapid resale of the licenses created an additional market, which also required
FCC regulation. See id. at 9609.
44. See id. at 9610. Licensing delays lasted for 10 years and "cost the U.S. economy
the equivalent of two percent of Gross National Product," calculated in 1991 numbers. Id.
Application production cost the government approximately $300 million, and resale trans-
action costs were approximately $190 million. See id. The fact that the nominal applica-
tion fees constituted the lotteries' only revenues compounded these expenses. See id. Lot-
teries encouraged greater speculation because of the inexpensive risk and huge potential
profits from resale, thus service delays naturally resulted from administrative burdens and
multiple license owners. See id; see also H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 248-49 (1993), re-
[Vol. 50:219
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winners making a profit on a free public resource as well as the ineffi-
ciency created when large amounts of radio spectrum remained unused
during the time it would take for these speculators to find buyers for
their licenses. 5
In 1993 Congress amended the FCA to implement competitive bidding
for licenses through auctions conducted by the FCC.46 Section 3090) of
the FCA charged the Commission with, among other things, the follow-
ing four objectives:
(A) the development and rapid deployment of new technolo-
gies ... for the benefit of the public ... without administrative
or judicial delays;
(B) promoting economic opportunity and competition . . . by
disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, in-
cluding small businesses... ;
(C) recovery for the public of a portion of the value of the pub-
lic spectrum resource ... ; and
(D) efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum. 47
Now the FCC exclusively manages the auctions through an elaborate
electronic system that allows qualified entities to bid against each other
48on a certain category of licenses. During the first step of this process,
printed in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 575-76 (finding inherent policy problems in competitive
hearing and lottery allocations, and concluding that payment for spectrum was in the pub-
lic interest).
45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining two of the major problems
with spectrum license lotteries). Administrative delays prevented the initial lottery win-
ners from receiving licenses for approximately one year and subsequent resales resulted in
additional lag time before the services were actually up and running on the spectrum. See
Spectrum Report, supra note 8, at 9609-10. In its decision to eliminate the lottery system,
Congress determined that the lottery system exploited a natural resource, and the fact that
unqualified entities received the licenses misconstrued its initial objective. See H.R. REP.
No. 103-111, at 248-49
46. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002(a),
107 Stat. 312, 387-392 (1993) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (1994 & Supp. III
1997)). Congress intended for auctions to reconcile the problems associated with the lot-
tery and competitive bidding systems by attaching a cost to the spectrum in order to dis-
suade speculators and place the licenses in the hands of those who would efficiently use
the spectrum. See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 246, 253; see also Second Report and Order,
supra note 8, at 2360, para. 70 & n.64. In addition, the public would receive compensation
for the use of public airwaves. See Spectrum Report, supra note 8, at 9612.
47. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)-(D).
48. See id. § 309(j)(3),(4); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2101, 1.2103, 1.2105 (1999) (outlin-
ing the bidding application procedures and general auction designs for all types of auc-
tioned spectrum); id. § 1.2109 (providing the guidelines for an auctioned license grant, de-
nial, disqualification, and default); id. §§ 1.1911, 1.2106, 1.2107 (listing the requirements
and FCC procedures regarding payment for licenses); id. §§ 24.302, 24.303, 24.711 (pro-
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the FCC announces an upcoming auction in an official public notice,
which specifies the spectrum geographically and provides guidelines for
each licensee's application.4 9  The Commission may require applicants
who are elected to participate in the auction to make an upfront payment
based on the amount of spectrum for which they intend to bid." This
payment is intended to ensure that only serious bidders participate in the
auctions.1
A winning bid, however, does not automatically result in a license
grant because the bidder has only won the exclusive right to apply for the
license. Upon submitting its license application, the winning bidder
must make a nonrefundable down payment that equals a certain per-
centage of its total bid.53 The Commission, by a subsequent public notice,
viding the types of bidding auctions and accompanying rules FCC uses to award Personal
Communications Services (PCS) licenses).
49. See Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2376, paras. 164-65. The public
notice will be issued not less than 75 days before the auction and normally contains the
following information: "the license[s] to be auctioned and the time, place and method of
competitive bidding to be used, including applicable bid submission procedures, bid with-
drawal procedures and penalties[,]" timelines for filing various forms, fees and upfront and
down payments. Id. para. 164. The FCC would subsequently provide an auction informa-
tion package to prospective bidders. See id. Bidders must submit auction applications and
bidder certification forms that identify the licenses for which the applicant seeks to bid,
the applicant's name, those who are authorized to make or withdraw bids, certifications
that the applicant is "legally, technically, financially and otherwise qualified pursuant to
Section 308(b) of the [FCA]" and any of the Act's other applicable service-specific qualifi-
cations, and certification that the applicant satisfies any financial requirements. Id. at
2376-77, para. 166 (footnotes omitted). The Commission then issues a second public no-
tice, listing all defective applications, and requests corrections from the applicants. See id.
at 2377, para. 168. The third public notice lists the applicants that are eligible to bid and
requires such applicants to submit the full amount of their upfront payments. See id.
50. See id.; 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2106, 24.306(a) (discussing the conditions under which the
Commission could require upfront and/or down payments); see also 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(4)
(authorizing the Commission to establish regulations regarding alternative payment meth-
ods); Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2378, para. 171. The FCC will determine
the amount of the upfront payment on an auction-by-auction basis to ensure its reason-
ableness and applicability to the type of licenses being auctioned. See id. The upfront
payment is also designed to subsidize any future penalties that may arise if a bidder with-
draws or defaults during the process. See id. at 2379, para. 176.
51. See Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2378, para. 171. The Commission
determined that upfront payments "[are] necessary to deter frivolous or insincere bid-
ding." Id.
52. See generally id. at 2383, para. 199 (indicating that the FCC will not automatically
award the licenses at the close of the auction because the winning bidder must still tender
the down payment and file a long-form application that the Commission will either ap-
prove or deny).
53. See id. at 2381, para. 189; 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2107(b), 24.306(b) (requiring each win-
ning bidder to make a down payment equal to 20% of its total winning bid).
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then announces the highest bidders and the licenses for which they bid.54
At this time, interested parties may provide specific allegations as to why
a grant of an application to the winning bidder would be inconsistent
with the public interest. 5 Next, the Commission evaluates the winning
bidder's application in light of its qualifications and any petitions that
56challenge them, and either grants or denies the license application. Af-
ter the FCC grants an application, it awards the license upon full pay-
ment of the winning bid. 7
B. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code: Furthering the American Dream Through
Equitable Protection of Property
1. Protecting the Estate for Reorganization and a Fresh Start
The Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor "to carry on and rebuild his
life" by making a "fresh start," while at the same time protecting a credi-
tor from significant losses by an insolvent debtor." Property, whether
54. See generally Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2383, paras. 199-202. At
this time, the winning bidders must submit long-form applications that are tailored to the
type of service that they will offer through the licenses. See id. at 2383, para. 199 n.151.
55. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997). The public notice will announce a fil-
ing window when parties in interest may submit petitions to deny the long-form applica-
tion. See id.; see also 47 C.F.R. § 1.2108(b) (1999). FCC regulations define a "party in in-
terest" as "a person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by the
Commission's authorization" of an application. Id. § 1.120(b)(1) (1999). Petitioners must
set forth specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that "a grant of the application
would be prima facie inconsistent" with the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1). Appli-
cants are then permitted to file responses, which will be considered in the final analysis.
See id.
56. See Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2383, paras. 199-200. If there are
no "substantial and material question[s] of fact" in the application or any other pleading,
and granting the application would be in the pubic interest, the FCC will grant the license.
47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(2); see also id. § 309(j)(5) (1994) (prohibiting the FCC from granting a
license unless the application is found to be in the public interest pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §
309(a) and meets specific qualifications pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(b), 310). In addition,
§ 308 requires that license applications set forth facts regarding the applicant's "citizen-
ship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications," as well as any additional
information the Commission may require in determining whether to grant or deny the li-
cense. Id. § 308(b); see also id. § 310 (addressing limitations on licenses owned or held by
foreign entities).
57. See Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2383, para. 199.
58. In re Andrews, 80 F.3d 906, 909-10 (4th Cir. 1996). The Bankruptcy Code's policy
not only prevents the debtor from having to liquidate all assets, it further permits his suc-
cessful rehabilitation, which necessarily involves balancing the estate's interests with those
of the creditor. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527-28 (1984); In re Cha-
teaugay Corp., 201 B.R. 48, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that reorganization of a
company favors the public and the government because it preserves jobs and the local
economy, and arguing that persons or legal entities who file a petition under the Bank-
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tangible or intangible, generally plays a central role in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. 9 Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code identifies what property
becomes part of the bankruptcy estate.6° Specifically, such property in-
cludes "[a]ll interests of the debtor . . . as of the commencement of the
case" and that which "the estate acquires after the commencement of the
case." 6' The Code protects a debtor's property by halting any actions
against the estate, suspending debts owed to creditors, and either modi-
fying payment plans or granting a total or partial avoidance of the
debts.62 The Code similarly protects creditors, even when the estate is
not large enough to cover all debt in full, by distributing the debtor's
63property fairly to satisfy the creditors' claims.
The automatic stay constitutes one of the basic debtor protections
within the Bankruptcy Code. 64 Section 362(a) stays debt collection ef-
forts, foreclosures, and actions to possess or control property of the es-
ruptcy Code should be permitted to enjoy its benefits); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (1994)
(defining debtor as "a person or municipality concerning which a [bankruptcy] case.., has
been commenced"); id § 101(10)(A) (defining a "creditor" as one who "has a claim against
a debtor that arose at the time of or before" such debtor's petition for relief under bank-
ruptcy law).
59. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (recognizing that the value of all assets,
including the debt owed on them, needs to be governed by a body of law that can equita-
bly determine the best way to retain such value in the best interests of all the parties asso-
ciated with the assets).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). When the Bankruptcy Code fails to do
so, state law must define the property in which the debtor actually has an interest. See In
re Ben Kennedy & Assocs., 40 F.3d 318, 319 (10th Cir. 1994); see also In re White, 851 F.2d
170, 173 (6th Cir. 1988). Once a debtor's interests are determined, federal bankruptcy law
dictates the extent to which those interests become part of the estate. See In re Omegas
Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443, 1450 (6th Cir. 1994).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2), (7). Property includes, among other things: bank deposits
and accounts, checks, insurance owned by debtor, land sale contracts, leased property, ac-
counts receivable, airport slots, assets of a corporation in which the debtor is a share-
holder, cars and other vehicles, community property, crops, deposits, escrow funds, stock
exchange seats, franchises, licenses and permits, livestock, marital property or obligations
such as alimony, and various personal property. For a complete listing, see 11 U.S.C.A. §
541 and accompanying notes (Supp. 2000).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994); id. § 1129 (detailing the requirements of a reorganiza-
tion plan).
63. Id. § 1 129(a)(5)(A)(ii) (ensuring that the bankruptcy plan is "consistent with the
interests of creditors and equity security holders and with public policy"); see id. §
1129(b)(1) (requiring the court to confirm a reorganization plan, upon request, if it is fair
and equitable to each class of impaired claims or interests, regardless of whether a creditor
accepts the plan).
64. Id. § 362(a) (stating that a petition filed under the Code or an application filed
under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 may operate as a stay); see also H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 340-44 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N, 5963, 6296-6300; S.
REP. NO. 95-989, at 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840-41 (providing
the legislative history behind 11 U.S.C. § 362).
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tate once the debtor has filed a petition for bankruptcy. 6' The stay helps
to preserve the assets' maximum values for the benefit of the debtor and
its creditors. 6  The stay also relieves the debtor or the bankruptcy trustee
from further financial burdens while they plan reorganization, repayment
of debts, and seek other remedies to further the Code's purposes.67
One such remedy allows the debtor to avoid the full or partial amount
of a debt if such obligation resulted from a fraudulent conveyance.6 ' The
petitioner must prove he incurred an obligation when he was engaged in
or was about to engage in a transaction where his remaining assets were
unreasonably small in relation to the cost of the transaction for which he
69allegedly did not receive a reasonably equivalent value. In deciding
such a case, the court must ultimately determine the value of the asset.7°
2. Government as a Regulator and the Exemption from Bankruptcy
Provisions
Federal courts recognize the power of the Bankruptcy Code to protect
65. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(8). Under this section, the commencement or continuation
of the following actions, among others, against a debtor are stayed: "judicial, administra-
tive, or other action or proceeding" that began or could have begun before the bank-
ruptcy, and any claims prior to bankruptcy; enforcement of a judgment obtained before
bankruptcy; obtaining or exercising control of estate property; creation, perfection or en-
forcement of a lien against estate property; collection, assessment or recovery of claims
that arose before bankruptcy. Id. § 362 (a)(1)-(6).
66. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.03[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev.
1999) (explaining that the stay is particularly important because without it, the debtor's
assets may be taken apart or destroyed).
67. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (c)(1) ("[T]he trustee may enter into transactions, in-
cluding the sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business .... ");
see also id. § 1108 (allowing the trustee to operate the debtor's business unless the court
orders otherwise). Case law has determined what constitutes an "ordinary course of busi-
ness" transaction by developing a "vertical test" and a "horizontal test" that are based on
business objectives and the Bankruptcy Code's policy of maintaining the estate's value. In
re Lavigne, 114 F.3d 379, 384, 385 (2d Cir. 1997); see also In re H & S Transportation Co.,
115 B.R. 592, 598, 599 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). Any transaction not made in the "ordinary
course of business" requires a hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). A debtor may cure defaults
on pre-petition claims by reversing the event that caused the default, such as a payment
deadline, and reinstating the obligation. See generally id. § 1123 (a)(5)(G) (allowing the
implementation of a debtor's reorganization plan through "curing or waiving of any de-
fault"); id. § 1124(2)(A) (allowing a reorganization plan that cures defaults occurring be-
fore or after bankruptcy regardless of any contract or law that entitles a creditor to accel-
erated payment); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 120, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 5787, 5906
(explaining the congressional intent of 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2)).
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. IV 1998); id. § 548 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). A
bankrupt entity must first assert a fraudulent conveyance claim against a creditor. See su-
pra note 19 and accompanying text (defining a fraudulent conveyance claim).
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
70. See In re Curtina Int'l., Inc., 23 B.R. 969, 974 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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a debtor's property, but they also consider "the countervailing policy fa-
voring state control of natural resources."'" "Absent clear intent by
Congress to place control of natural resources in the hands of bankruptcy
courts," courts generally have no authority to issue injunctions against a
debtor's government regulated property.72 Furthermore, any court-
ordered remedy applied to such property is subject to attendant regula-
tions. 73 The Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that certain debts owed
to the government must be paid, notwithstanding a grant of avoidance or
similar pardon to the debtor.7 4 Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code
serves a similar purpose by granting an exception to the automatic stay
for government regulatory actions or proceedings.75 The action, how-
ever, must involve a regulatory enforcement; it must not be used to ad-
vance the government's pecuniary interests. 6 The courts also consider
whether the government's assertion of regulatory power furthers public
policy, as opposed to merely adjudicating the debtor's private rights.77
C. Licenses in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Bankruptcy courts recognize that licenses, in many instances, come to
the estate encumbered with specific conditions and restrictions imposed
71. In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 35 B.R. 400, 402 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983)
(discussing California Oil Co. v. Huffstutler, 332 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1963), in which the
court held that actions involving regulated state property filled with oil reserves could not
be stayed by a bankruptcy court).
72. Id.
73. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 130-33 (1945) (con-
demning a state court's annulment of a radio station transfer that returned all assets to the
licensee because the court had no authority over claims relating to FCC licenses). The
Supreme Court determined that the FCC's regulatory power controls any and all actions
pertaining to spectrum licenses, and, thus, remedies provided by the courts must accom-
modate that purpose. See id.
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9) (1994) (preventing a stay from interfering with the gov-
ernment's tax collection procedures); id. § 362(b)(8) (allowing the government to enforce
Housing and Urban Development mortgages); id. § 365(o) (requiring that the trustee
honor the debtor's commitments to federal depository institutions' regulatory agencies in
an order to maintain the governing institution's capital); id. § 523(a)(l) (preventing the
discharge of certain taxes owed to the IRS); cf 37 U.S.C. § 302(i) (1994) (exempting re-
funds of special retention pay given to medical military officers from the Bankruptcy
Code).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1998). Section 362(b)(4) may exempt debt that
resulted from the enforcement of the government's regulatory power although no body of
law provides an express exemption. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d
1020,1025 (2d Cir. 1991).
76. See In re Universal Life Church, Inc., 128 F.3d 1294, 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1997);
see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 1, 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838 (ex-
plaining the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)).
77. See, e.g., In re Yellow Cab Coop. Assoc., 132 F.3d 591, 597 (10th Cir. 1997).
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by the issuing entity."8 Several courts have held that, in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, the estate takes the license with accompanying restrictions or
conditions because "the estate may take no greater interest than that
held by the debtor."79 Thus, in most instances, the bankruptcy estate or
creditors that received transferred licenses, permits, or leases must honor
restrictions on use, back taxes, levies, or fees that accompany the prop-
erty.80
The Federal Communications Act authorizes the Commission to
award and rescind spectrum licenses.8" Yet when the licenses become a
78. Cf. Board of Trade of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 8-9, 12 (1924); Hyde v.
Woods, 94 U.S. 523, 524-25 (1876) (upholding a stock exchange board's constitutional
provision that required proceeds from the assignment of a bankrupt member's seat to go
to his creditors who were board members before going to nonmember creditors). In both
decisions, the Supreme Court "app[lied] property rights analyses in finding that restric-
tions imposed by a debtor's transferor are valid in bankruptcy." In re Farmers Markets,
Inc., 792 F.2d 1400,1403 (9th Cir. 1986).
79. In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 792 F.2d at 1403. In Farmers Markets, the court held
that "the debtors' estates took the liquor licenses subject to the [sitate's right to payment"
of delinquent taxes. Id. at 1404; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A) (1994) (stating that the
debtor's property interest may transfer to the bankruptcy estate notwithstanding any law
that "restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor"). This technical provi-
sion ensures a seamless transfer of property from the debtor to the estate. Section
541(c)(1)(A) applies to conditions on an asset that restricts transferability, as opposed to
conditions that pertain to current possesory assets or the acquisition process of assets. See,
e.g., In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 792 F.2d at 1402 (quoting In re Polycorp Assocs., Inc., 47
B.R. 671, 672 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1985): "'The plain meaning of [the legislative history] is
that 541(c)(1)(A) is intended to eliminate barriers to the transfer of property to the estate,
and nothing more."').
80. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541.07[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15 ed. rev.
1999) (stating that "a trustee must conform in all respects to a license which comes into the
estate upon the bankruptcy of a licensee [because] the trustee occupies the same position
as the debtor" and is thus responsible for all burdens that accompany the license); see gen-
erally In re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1263-64 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that a debtor air-
line's proprietary interest in airport landing slots issued by the Federal Aviation Admini-
stration (FAA) hinged upon a rule revoking the slots pursuant to FAA regulations,
notwithstanding the bankruptcy ruling that counted them as assets of the estate); In re
Farmers Markets, Inc., 792 F.2d at 1404 (concluding that taxes on liquor licenses must be
paid upon transfer to the bankruptcy estate); In re Professional Bar Co., 537 F.2d 339, 340
(9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (finding that the value of the bankrupt estate equaled the
debtor's liquor licenses minus any back taxes or fees owed on those licenses, and that any
claims against the estate are limited to this difference in value); In re Access Beyond
Technologies, Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 38 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (stating that a Chapter 11 trustee
assumed all rights and limitations that the debtor-licensees had in patent license agree-
ments, which included restrictions on alienation without the licensor's prior approval).
81. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (providing that the FCC grants licenses with its exclusive
authority under the FCA and the rules promulgated thereby); id. § 151 (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (stating that the FCC "shall execute and enforce the provisions of [the Communica-
tions Act of 1934]"); id. § 303 (1994) (outlining the FCC's authority regarding radio spec-
trum licenses); id. § 307(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (outlining the terms of allocating spec-
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central factor in bankruptcy proceedings, the Commission "is obliged to
reconcile its policies under the Communications Act with the policies of
other federal laws and statutes, including the federal bankruptcy laws in
particular. 8 2 In several cases, the FCC's initial role is to grant or deny a
license transfer occurring under the direction of a bankruptcy court,
without addressing whether the licenses were included in the distribution
or reorganization of the debtor's estate.83 Under the FCA, licenses do
not confer any property rights on the licensees per se, and the supremacy
of the government's regulatory power to prohibit the transfer of licenses
as property to the bankrupt estate is affirmed.8 The FCC's normal pro-
cedure, however, is to recognize licenses as assets in the estate because
the Commission retains final approval of who uses the licenses.85
trum licenses); id. § 309 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (outlining the conditions attached to spec-
trum licenses); see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 553 (1990) (stating
that Congress vested the FCC with exclusive power to grant licenses "based on public
convenience, interest, or necessity"); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157, 168 (1968) (noting that Congress expected the FCC to be the only agency with juris-
diction and "'regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication"').
82. In re Dale J. Parsons, Jr., 10 F.C.C.R. 2718, 2720, para. 11 (Mar. 7, 1995) (mem.);
see also In re O.D.T. Int'l, 9 F.C.C.R. 2575, 2576, para. 7 (June 9, 1994) (mem.); In re Are-
cibo Radio Corp., 101 F.C.C.2d 545, 550 & n.12 (1985). Courts recognize that the FCC's
authority concerning spectrum rights requires a careful balance between the rights of
bankrupt licensees and their creditors. See LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1146 n.2 (1974).
Although "the Commission should assure that licensees do not use bankruptcy as a means
of circumventing their obligation to operate in the public interest[,]" the Commission must
also consider the Bankruptcy Code's inherent protection of innocent creditors. Id. The
FCC agreed to continue to defer generally to bankruptcy laws on many matters, assuming
that the transferee in bankruptcy proceedings is qualified to hold a license. See In re Im-
plementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, 10
F.C.C.R. 403,471-72, para. 135 (Apr. 20,1994) [hereinafter Fifth Memorandum Opinion &
Order].
83. See, e.g., In re Central Ark. Broad. Co., 68 F.3d 213, 214-15 (8th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (finding that the court should determine whether FCC licenses constitute prop-
erty of the estate, but that such a finding does not negate the fact that subsequent transfer
of the licenses as a result of bankruptcy is contingent upon the Commission's approval); In
re PBR Communications Sys., Inc., 172 B.R. 132, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (finding that
a licensee's proprietary interest in a license "does not allow any party to assert any rights
contrary to the FCC's regulatory powers").
84. See, e.g., In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 35 B.R. 400, 401, 403-04 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that FCC licenses could not be included in the bankruptcy es-
tate because they were rights to use the public radio frequency and not freely transferable
property).
85. See Central Ark. Broad. Co., 68 F.3d at 214-15. Whether spectrum licenses can
actually be considered as property of a bankrupt estate presents a broad question. See id.
at 214-15; In re Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d 829, 837 (1983). But see D.H. Overmyer Telecasting
Co., 35 B.R. at 401, 404 (finding spectrum licenses did not constitute property of the estate
as commonly defined). The Overmyer court held that the licenses conveyed "a right
granted by a government agency, subject to the use restrictions imposed by that agency."
Id. at 401. The court expressed concern that a licensee may use bankruptcy law to restrict
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Generally, the Commission is not financially implicated in a licensee's
bankruptcy proceeding because the licenses are paid for in full and, thus,
its regulations are almost always accommodated." Installment plans and
the Commission's new role as a lender, however, have challenged the
Commission's power in the most recent wave of C-Block license bank-
ruptcies. 7
D. Opportunities for the Little Fish in the Big Sea: FCC Offers
Installment Plans to Enable Small Companies to Compete in the Personal
Communications Services Market
In response to the concern that competitive bidding could prevent
small entrepreneurs from participating in the Personal Communications
Services (PCS) market,88 Congress directed the FCC to auction specific
blocks of spectrum to qualified small businesses and to offer flexible
payment plans.s9 In May and July of 1996, the FCC's C-Block auction of
PCS licenses resulted in bids that aggregated $10.2 billion.9° Successful
the governing agency's regulatory power and enhance his own property rights as a debtor,
which directly violates the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 404.
86. See Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 82, at 471-72, para. 135;
Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d at 837.
87. See 3 FCC Commissioners Defend Wireless Auction Process, COMM. DAILY, 'Sept.
23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 7580438; Jeffrey Silva, Is FCC's Mission Changing?, RCR
RADIO COMM. REP., May 3, 1999, available in 1999 WL 7791035; Debra Wayne, C-
Blockers Dispute UCC Forms Existence: Without Them, Does FCC Have First Lien
Rights?, RCR RADIO COMM. REP., Sept. 15, 1997, available in 1999 WL 8325457.
88. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTiONARY 629 (15th ed. 1999).
PCS encompasses a broad range of wireless services that allow people or equipment to
communicate regardless of where they are located. See id. Generally, PCS may be used
with lightweight phones or hand-held computers, via data and voice communication tech-
nology that is newer than cellular technology. See id. at 624, 629. The system compares
with cellular technology, but is digital, low power, operates on a higher frequency than
cellular, and is capable of.offering some digital messaging on the telephone's screen. See
id. at 624. The premise behind PCS is that "phones are cheaper, have less range, are digi-
tal; the cells [are] smaller and closer together and the airtime would be cheaper also." Id.
The FCC awards the C-Block to 30 MHz PCS carriers serving a geographic area in the
1895-1910 MHz frequency, paired with 1975-1990 MHz frequency. See id.
89. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B), (j)(4)(A) (1994).
90. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998) (NextWave 1) (stating that 90 bidders won the right to apply for 493 li-
censes at the C-Block auction). Two-hundred and fifty-five bidders out of an initial pool
of 493 "qualified to bid in the auction, the largest number of bidders in any FCC auction
thus far." FCC Wireless Telecommunications B~ureau, Broadband Personal Communica-
tions Services "C Block" Auction Closes (visited Oct. 11, 2000) <http://www.fcc.
gov/Bureaus/Wireless/NewsReleases/1996/ nrwl602l.txt>. The FCC issued this news re-
lease on May 6, 1996. As of August 31, 1997, the FCC garnered revenues in excess of $12
billion from successful auctions that offered installment plans. See Spectrum Report, supra
note 8, at 9603 & n.2.
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bidders had to pay the Commission ten percent of the bid in cash, and
the remaining ninety percent in deferred installments over ten years.
91
By the end of the auction, the FCC had already announced plans to auc-
tion additional PCS licenses in the D, E, and F blocks, and accepted final
bids for these blocks through January 14, 1997.92 The winning bids on the
latter blocks were significantly lower than those of the C-Block, despite
the fact that they covered many of the same geographic areas." This de-
crease was not attributed to a decrease in the value of the PCS market,
but to the extraordinarily high bids generated in the C-Block auction.9 4
Winning bidders in the C-Block licenses had artificially raised the pre-
mium on the spectrum, which turned out to falsely reflect the actual
market value of PCS spectrum.9
91. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2110(f), 24.711(b) (1999); In re Implementation of Section
309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C.R. 5532, 5593, para. 138
(July 15, 1994) [hereinafter Fifth Report and Order]; see also NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 266.
92. See NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 266; see also In re Amendment of the Commission's
Rules Regarding Installment Payment Fin. for Personal Communications Servs. (PCS)
Licensees, 12 F.C.C.R. 16436, 16441, para. 9 (Oct. 16, 1997) [hereinafter Restructuring Or-
der]. The FCC conducted its PCS C-Block auctions on May 6,1996 and July 16, 1996. See
NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 266. The D, E, and F Block auctions commenced on August 26,
1996. See id. Although the Commission granted licenses to 90% of the C-Block winners
on September 17, 1996, some companies, such as NextWave, did not receive approval until
January 3, 1997. See id.
93. See NextWave I, 235 B.R. at 266-67 & n.3. (noting that the FCC allocated the C,
D, E, and F Blocks to specific geographic areas called BTAs, or Basic Trading Areas).
The value of the licenses is determined, in part, by the amount of people served within a
BTA, referred to as "Pops," and the capacity of the allocated spectrum to cover the BTA
measured in megahertz. Id. at 267 n.3. NextWave bid an average of $1.43 per MHZ-Pops,
while the winning bids in the D and E blocks averaged $.35 per MHZ-Pops and the F flock
averaged approximately $.246 per MHZ-Pops. See id.
94. See Fritts, supra note 29, at 863-64. As newcomers to the market, many of the C-
Block bidders tended to overbid; consequently, many C-Block bidders gauged the price of
spectrum inaccurately. See id. at 863. In addition, payments on the winning bids were de-
ferred for 10 years at below market interest rates, which most likely curbed any incentive
to bid conservatively at the auction. See id. A serious problem, however, revolved around
the inability of companies such as NextWave to recognize the actual upfront costs of cre-
ating and implementing a system and failure to calculate what they could actually afford to
bid. See id. C-Block bidders also ignored the two previous A and B Block auctions that
allocated spectrum in the same markets, and chose to purchase C-Block licenses at more
than triple the amount carriers paid in the A and B Blocks. See Marc Cabi, Finding a
Resolution for the FCC's C-Block PCS Auction Debacle, RCR RADIO COMM. REP., Sept.
15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8325499.
95. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing C-Block bidders); see also In
re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 277, 286, 298-99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1.999) (NextWave IVA) (explaining that many of the high bidders in the C-Block auction
could not obtain financing due to the fact that the investment banking community be-
lieved, based on the lower winning bids in the D/E/F Block auction, that the cost of the C-
Block licenses was "grossly excessive" compared to their market value). NextWave
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On March 13, 1997, the FCC suspended the installment payment
deadlines for C-Block licensees because several companies sought to
modify their payment obligations.96 After a lengthy investigation, the
FCC reinstated the C-Block payment deadlines and allowed the licensees
to choose one of three new payment options to ease the financial bur-
dens.97 The options consisted of: (1) disaggregation and return of one
half of the licensees' spectrum to the FCC for re-auction, (2) amnesty in
the form of debt forgiveness in exchange for all of the licensees, and (3)
prepayment.98 The FCC reinstated the payment deadline as July 31,
1998, with a ninety-day grace period to October 29, 1998.99 Licensees
who failed to resume payments would be in default and their licenses
would automatically cancel.10 Some companies chose one of the options,
needed approximately $700 million in public financing to implement its business plan. See
id. at 286. Providers flooded the PCS market, most of which received their licenses at the
same time as some of the C-Block licensees, but without the same amount of debt. See
Deborah L. Schrier-Rape & Jason S. Brookner, The FCC as Creditor: Attempts to Legis-
late Out of the Bankruptcy Court (visited Sept. 18, 2000) <http://www.abiworld.org
/legis/reform/dsrspeech.html>. C-Block winners sought approximately $1.6 billion from
outside investors to assist in building facilities, but the financial markets never provided
financing. See NextWave IV.A, 235 B.R. at 286.
96. See In re Installment Payments for PCS Licenses, 12 F.C.C.R. 17,325, 17,326
(Mar. 31, 1997). The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau suspended installment pay-
ments so that the FCC could consider the many payment proposals offered by financially
strapped C-Block licensees. See Spectrum Report, supra note 8, at 9632.
97. See Restructuring Order, supra note 92, at 16,439, para 6. The payment options
resulted from the FCC Wireless Bureau's request for public comment on payment restruc-
turing and subsequent public forum attended by more than 150 representatives from the
industry and financial markets. See Spectrum Report, supra note 8, at 9632-33. The Bu-
reau received more than 100 comments and an additional 200 ex parte filings in response
to the request. See id. at 9633. The October 16th report reinstated the installment sched-
ule and set the next deadline for March 31, 1998. See Restructuring Order, supra note 92,
at 16,437, para. 1. The deadline for C-Block licensees to choose one of three payment op-
tions outlined in the report expired on January 15, 1998. See id. at 16,439, para. 6.
98. See Restructuring Order, supra note 92, at 16,439, para. 6. Following a series of
comments on the new installment schedule, the Commission modified the October 16 Re-
structuring Order to give additional flexibility to companies. See In re Amendment of the
Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Fin. for Personal Communication
Servs. (PCS) Licensees, 13 F.C.C.R. 8345, 8346, para. 2, 8350-51, paras. 11-15 (Mar. 24,
1998) [hereinafter Reconsideration Order]. Pursuant to the order, companies could also
opt to continue payment on the established installment plan. See id. at 8347, para. 5.
99. See Wireless Telecomm. Bureau Announces June 8, 1998 Election Date for
Broadband PCS C Block Licensees, 13 F.C.C.R. 7413, 7413-14 (Apr. 17, 1998); see also 47
C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(4)(i)-(ii) (1999); Wireless Telecomm. Bureau Provides Guidance on
Grace Period and Installment Payment Rules, 13 F.C.C.R. 18,213, 18,214-15 (Sept. 18,
1998) [hereinafter Guidance on Grace Period] (governing the rules for installment pay-
ment grace periods including the amendment in the Reconsideration Order allowing a 90-
day grace period for C-Block payments); Reconsideration Order, supra note 98, at 8347,
para. 6, 8353, para. 23 (noting the postponement of previous election dates).
100. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110 (f)(4)(i)-(iv) (1999); Guidance on Grace Period, supra note
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but many companies believed they would still be unable to remain fis-
cally stable under any of these conditions, and either returned the li-
censes or filed for bankruptcy.'0 '
E. The NextWave Case
The largest C-Block license holder to file a fraudulent conveyance ac-
tion against the FCC is NextWave Personal Communications, Inc.'02 In
July 1996, after bidding $4.74 billion for sixty-three licenses in the C-
Block auction, the company became a winning bidder, and paid $474
million to satisfy the ten percent down payment requirement. 3
NextWave arranged to pay the remaining $4.26 billion in installment
payments and, in January 1997, the Commission approved the company's
license applications and awarded the licenses to NextWave.'
The low bidding in the D, E, and F block auctions had already begun
and significantly drove down the value of the C-Block licenses to only
thirteen percent of NextWave's bid price, which adversely affected the
company's ability to attract investors.' NextWave claimed it suffered
additional losses because the company was unable to build its PCS sys-
99, at 18,214 (reiterating that C-Block licenses will automatically cancel if a licensee's in-
stallment payment is more than 180 days delinquent); see also In re Request for Extension
of the Commission's Initial Non-Delinquency Period for C and F Block Installment Pay-
ments, 14 F.C.C.R. 6080, 6082, paras. 4-5 (Apr. 2, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Delinquency
Order]; In re Request for Extension of the Commission's Initial Non-Delinquency Period
for C and F Block Installment Payments, 13 F.C.C.R. 22,071, 22,071, para. 1 (Oct. 29,
1998) [hereinafter 1998 Delinquency Order]. The FCC denied the requests of four licen-
sees for deadline extensions because their situations were no different than any other fi-
nancially strapped licensees. The Commission determined that strict adherence to the Oc-
tober 29, 1998 deadline was essential to maintaining the integrity of the rules. See 1998
Delinquency Order, supra at 22,072-74, paras. 3-6.
101. See FCC Releases Official C-Block Election Results; Numbers Still Likely to
Change Via Bankruptcy Cases, PCS WEEK, June 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8015944;
Shrier-Rape & Brookner, supra note 95, at 4.
102. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 277, 283 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y 1999) (NextWave IV.A) (naming Sprint PCS and AT&T Wireless PCS as the
largest PCS licensees, holding A, B, D, and E Block licenses amounting to 99% and 93%
of total U.S. Pops eligible for service respectively). NextWave was the third largest holder
of PCS spectrum with 61% of the populations covered, followed by OmniPoint PCS En-
trepreneurs at 36%, and Western Wireless and PrimeCo. at 23%. See id. at 283-84. As of
1999, all these companies held licenses in the C, D, E, and F Blocks. See id.
103. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998) (NextWave I).
104. See id. at 266 (explaining that the FCC awarded the licenses in January 1997, but
the company did not execute the corresponding promissory notes for the remaining 90%
of the bid until February 17,1997).
105. See id. at 267 & n.3.
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tem during the period when the applications were pending approval.16
The company subsequently filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 8,
1998, due to financial distress.17
NextWave simultaneously initiated an adversary proceeding against
the FCC, through which it sought to avoid its C-Block license payment
obligations.'8 The bankruptcy court held that under § 544 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the FCC had fraudulently conveyed the C-Block licenses to
NextWave because the payment obligations dramatically exceeded the
actual value of the licenses by the time the company received them.l'
The bankruptcy court determined that NextWave did not become obli-
gated to the FCC until the licenses were received, and it reduced the
company's total debt by nearly $3.7 billion."0 The Commission argued
that its regulatory power and the FCA preempted actions that would
modify or annul any conditions accompanying the licenses, and asserted
106. See NextWave IV.A, 235 B.R. at 286 (discussing how NextWave's failure to get
$700 million in financing rendered it unable to set up its PCS infrastructure).
107. See NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 267. After declining to select one of the Commis-
sion's payment plans by the designated deadline, NextWave filed a petition to stay this
deadline. See id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the
request. See id.
108. See NextWave's First Amended Complaint at 4, para. 6, 23, paras. 85-86, In re
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(NextWave 1) (seeking a reduction of the winning bid price as legal remedy).
109. In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311, 318 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (NextWave VI) (affirming the bankruptcy court's finding that the approximate value
of the 63 C-Block licenses on which the company bid was just over $1 billion when
NextWave transacted with the FCC in February 1997). The court arrived at this value by
comparing the price NextWave bid for the C-Block licenses with the price of the D, E, and
F Block licenses. See NextWave IV.A, 235 B.R. at 303-04. Section 544 of the Bankruptcy
Code provides a remedy of avoidance of all debts found to be fraudulently conveyed. 11
U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining fraudu-
lent conveyance).
110. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 314, 316 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave V); In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R.
305, 309 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave IV.B) (explaining that NextWave was not re-
quired to pay the portion of the bid price that was found to be fraudulently conveyed).
Contrary to the FCC's interpretation of the auction guidelines, the court determined that
NextWave did not actually become indebted to the Commission until it executed promis-
sory notes in January of 1997. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235
B.R. 272, 275-76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave II). Although the company bid $4.7
billion for the licenses six months earlier, this bid only guaranteed NextWave the right to
seek the FCC's approval of license application. See NextWave IV.A, 235 B.R. at 284. Ac-
cording to the court, the FCC fraudulently conveyed the licenses because they were worth
$3.7 billion at the time NextWave executed the promissory notes, which was less than the
amount NextWave originally agreed to pay. See id. at 280. The fact that the lengthy ap-
plication process did not guarantee that NextWave would receive the licenses reinforced
the court's finding that no valid obligation had actually been made at the close of the auc-
tion. See id. at 284.
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that NextWave must pay its winning bid or return the licenses.' The
court acknowledged the FCC's regulatory authority to issue licenses;
however, it held that this power did not exempt the Commission from
the Bankruptcy Code's definition of a creditor because the Commission
sought payment from NextWave and subsequently entered into agree-
ments to achieve that end.' 2 Citing the Bankruptcy Code, the court de-
termined that as a creditor, the Commission was subject to its jurisdiction
and that nothing in the Communications Act or any other body of law
expressly stated otherwise."3
After the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court rulings,"4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed to hear the
FCC's appeal. "5 In December 1999, the appeals court held that the lower
courts did not have jurisdiction to review the Commission's regulatory
decisions nor the authority to interfere with its license allocation, and
found that no fraudulent conveyance occurred because NextWave be-
came obligated to the winning bid at the close of the auction. ' Shortly
after the ruling, NextWave agreed to pay the full balance due on its C-
Block licenses."7 However, on January 12, 2000, the FCC announced
that NextWave's C-Block licenses had automatically cancelled due to
nonpayment and that they would be reauctioned later in July 2000.18
On January 31, 2000, the bankruptcy court held that the FCC's deci-
sion to cancel NextWave's licenses violated the automatic stay protecting
the company's bankruptcy estate. "9 The court explained that the Bank-
111. See NextWave IV.B, 235 B.R. at 307,311,314; NextWave V, 235 B.R. at 316-17.
112. See NextWave V, 235 B.R. at 316-17 ("[T]he substance of the matter is that the
FCC's right to payment as a creditor is subject to avoidance under the relevant bankruptcy
code provisions just like the right to payment of any other creditor.").
113. See id.; see also NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 265, 269 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334, which
specifically grants jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and attendant proceedings).
114. See NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 321; see also supra note 18 (listing the NextWave
rulings).
115. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, No. 99-5063 (2d
Cir. 1999) (order granting motion for stay of the consummation plan and confirmation
plan) (NextWave VII), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980).
116. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 54, 56 (explaining that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2342
and 47 U.S.C. § 402, review of FCC regulatory decisions are entrusted solely to the federal
courts of appeals). Although the FCC regulated the conditions of the licenses and the auc-
tion process, the court noted that "[the FCC] may find itself acting as a creditor" if it
sought recovery from NextWave. Id. at 59 & n.15.
117. See Senate Hearing, supra note 25.
118. See Cancellation Notice, supra note 25.
119. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 257-58 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NextWave VIII).
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ruptcy Code protected NextWave from defaulting on its payments.2° In
addition, the court held that the "timely payment" condition on the li-
censes did not serve a regulatory purpose and that the FCC acted solely
as a creditor to further the government's pecuniary interests. 2' Accord-
ingly, the court determined that the Commission violated the automatic
stay,22 abridged NextWave's rights to cure its defaults,23 and discrimi-
nated against the company because of its bankruptcy status.
21
The FCC subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which contended that the bank-
ruptcy court's opinion contravened the Second Circuit's December 22,
1999 ruling.12 1 In May 2000, the Second Circuit granted the FCC's peti-
tion, and directed the bankruptcy court to vacate its February 7, 2000 or-
der and lift the automatic stay as it applied to the FCC's jurisdiction over
,- 126
the licenses. The appeals court agreed with the Commission, explain-
ing that the "timely payment" condition on the licenses is just as much a
regulatory provision as the payment in full condition because "whenever
an FCC decision implicates its exclusive power to dictate the terms and
conditions of licensure, the decision is regulatory" and thus immune from
120. See id. at 257-58, 264 (stating that the Code prohibits a debtor from making pay-
ments on pre-petition claims unless a court orders it to do so). The court also found that
the FCC violated the doctrines of equitable estoppel and waiver in its third reason for en-
forcing the automatic stay. See id. at 257-58.
121. Id. at 261, 274-75, 281 n.26 (finding that NextWave's timeliness in payments is a
function of debtor-creditor economics and asserting that the FCC acts as a creditor re-
garding pre-petition claims, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Code).
122. See id. at 267.
123. See id. at 268-69. The Bankruptcy Code allows NextWave's reorganization plan
to suspend any default payments and reinstate its obligations to their pre-bankruptcy
status. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1124 (1994); see supra note 67 and accompanying text (explain-
ing these sections in greater detail).
124. See NextWave VIII, 244 B.R. at 269-70. The court concluded that the FCC vio-
lated § 525 of the Bankruptcy Code because it cancelled NextWave's licenses due to the
company's non-payment of a pre-petition claim. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (pro-
hibiting the government from denying or revoking a license solely because the debtor is in
bankruptcy or has not paid a dischargeable debt). The court did not formally rule on this
issue, but would do so if one of the parties reopened the issue. See NextWave VIII, 244
B.R. at 271.
125. See In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2000) (NextWave IX) (granting the FCC
leave to file a writ of mandamus to address whether the bankruptcy court's January 31,
1999 opinion is consistent with the appeals court's December 22, 1999 ruling), petition for
cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2000) (No. 00-447). The Order also denied
NextWave's request for a rehearing on the December 22, 1999 decision and reversed its
order of January 24, 2000 that directed the FCC to appeal the bankruptcy court's latest
ruling to the district court. See id.
126. See id. at 141 (ordering the bankruptcy court to deny NextWave's January 2000
motion to enforce the automatic stay to prohibit the FCC from reclaiming the licenses).
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the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.'27 The court also condoned the
FCC's plan to reauction NextWave's licenses, finding that such action is
one that invokes enforceable regulatory terms.1
28
The Second Circuit did not rule on whether the FCC's cancellation was
procedurally valid under administrative law, as that issue can only be ad-
dressed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 129 The writ of
mandamus applied specifically to the Commission's regulatory actions
vis-a-vis the Bankruptcy Code, leaving unanswered the question of
whether NextWave will ever recover the C-Block licenses.' The issue
before the appeals court was whether the "timely payment" and auto-
matic cancellation conditions on the licenses serve a regulatory func-
tion.' 3 Because the appeals court found that these conditions are in fact
regulatory, the Commission is permitted to cancel and reauction
NextWave's licenses, despite the protections afforded by the Bankruptcy
Code."' An analysis of how the courts arrived at their contrary rulings
requires examination of several elements, including the FCC conditions
placed on spectrum licenses, the FCC's mandated charge as the regulator
of radio spectrum and licenses, coupled with its role as lender to the
bankrupt companies, and legislative intent in enacting both the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the FCA.
II. WHICH LAW GOVERNS: THE FATE OF THE C-BLOCK LICENSES IN
BANKRUPTCY
A. Conditions on Spectrum Licenses
The FCA expressly provides that a radio spectrum license creates no
ownership rights for licensees and can only be used pursuant to specific
conditions under the FCC's authority.33 Congress included these limits
127. Id. at 135.
128. See id. at 135-36 (holding that the bankruptcy court has no power to rule on
whether the FCC may reauction NextWave's licenses because regulations provide, and the
FCA mandates, that all licenses must be utilized pursuant to the Commission's exclusive
jurisdiction).
129. See id. at 139-40; see also supra note 28 (explaining that § 402 of the FCA pro-
vides an appeal process for final FCC decisions).
130. See NextWave IX, 217 F.3d at 137, 140.
131. Id. at 134 (granting a petition for a writ of mandamus against the bankruptcy
court for imposing an automatic stay against the FCC). The bankruptcy court ignored the
FCC's cancellation of the licenses because it found that the condition of timely installment
payments was not a regulatory function. See id. at 129.
132. See id. at 135-36.
133. 47 U.S.C § 301 (1994) (stating that the FCA shall "provide for the use of [radio
spectrum] channels, but not the ownership thereof ... for limited periods of time, under
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to prevent licensees from asserting property rights against the govern-
ment134 and to provide the government with ultimate control of an impor-
tant public resource."'
Bankruptcy estate trustees usually hold an interest in estate assets,
such as licenses, equal to the interest that the debtor holds 6 and subject
to the same rules.137  The FCC conditioned its grant of a license to
NextWave on the "timely payment of the winning bid amount," subject
to automatic revocation if there was a failure to do so."" Although the
bankruptcy court maintained that the Bankruptcy Code governed the li-
licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any
right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license"). The FCA provides that:
No ... station license, or any rights thereunder, shall be transferred, assigned, or
disposed of in any manner ... or by transfer of control of any corporation hold-
ing such permit or license ... except upon application to the Commission and
upon finding by the Commission that the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity will be served thereby.
Id. § 310(d).
134. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) (holding
that the Act protects the public and does not shield license holders from competition in
the market); see also In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 35 B.R. 400, 402 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1983) (suggesting that an FCC license may be a "rule designed to regulate [the
holder's] use of its ... equipment"); In re Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d 829, 830-31 (1983) (noting
that the FCC has continuously held that the assumption of property rights in a license
"endangers the independence of the licensee who is and who should be" accountable only
to the FCC).
135. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301,304; see also P & R Temmer v. FCC, 743 F.2d 918, 928 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (upholding the automatic cancellation of an FCC license due to a licensee's fail-
ure to agree to and to accept any and all conditions to which the particular license is sub-
ject).
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994) (Historical and Revision Notes, Legislative
Statements, para. 6); see also In re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1260 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that all proprietary interests held by an airline in airport landing slot licenses are
limited and encumbered by the FAA's regulations and may be revoked despite a bank-
ruptcy court's imposition of an automatic stay); In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 792 F.2d 1400,
1403 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the bankruptcy estate cannot have a greater interest in
the licenses than the debtor because the estate is subject to outstanding tax liens on liquor
licenses); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 80, 541.07 [2] ("[T]he trustee occupies
the same position as the debtor, including the responsibility for all burdens as well as
benefits.").
137. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (expressly prohibiting voluntary or involuntary transfers or
assignments of licenses without a finding by the Commission that the public interest is be-
ing served).
138. In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2000) (NextWave IX), petition for cert.
filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2000) (No. 00-447); In re NextWave Personal
Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1999) (NextWave VII), cert. denied, 69
U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980); see also id. § 24.708(a) (1998); id. §
24.711(b) (requiring each C-Block licensee to pay the net auction price in timely install-
ments); 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(4)(iv) (1999) (stating that the license will automatically can-
cel upon default of payment).
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censes in the NextWave litigation, the appeals court found that
NextWave's avoidance of the bid payment, which the bankruptcy court
granted, and its refusal to return the licenses ignored agreed-upon guide-
lines that legally bound NextWave.9 The appeals court reasoned that a
licensee must accept all conditions on licenses, including those that en-
force obligations, and that the bankruptcy court exceeded its power by
allowing NextWave to keep the licenses without adhering to their condi-
tions.'40 The Second Circuit held that the bankruptcy court erroneously
granted spectrum rights absent FCC authority by overriding these condi-
tions. 141
Although bankruptcy law dictates that licenses become property of the
estate despite any conditions or restrictions, § 541(c)(1)(A) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code "invalidates restrictions on the transfer of property of the
debtor, in order that all of the interests of the debtor in property will be-
come the property of the estate. 1 42  In bankruptcy proceedings, the
Commission usually acquiesces to the transfer of spectrum licenses to an
estate trustee, with the understanding that the licenses retain all condi-
tions, and that the Commission must approve any subsequent transfers
from the estate. 43 Therefore, it can be interpreted that the Bankruptcy
139. See, e.g., NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 54-55 (asserting that the bankruptcy court had
no power to override the FCC's regulations or the FCA).
140. See id. at 54 (citing P & R Temmer v. FCC, 743 F.2d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
141. See id.; see also Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) ("[N]o
court can grant an applicant an authorization which the Commission has refused."). The
Ninth Circuit recently held that § 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code may preclude debtors
from retaining a license when the law allows the licensor to refuse such use without the
licensor's consent. See In re Catapult Entertainment Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 748 (9th Cir.
1999), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 369 (1999). The FCA provides that no spectrum license
can be granted unless the Commission finds "that the public interest, convenience, and
necessity will be served thereby." 47 U.S.C. § 310(d). This proposition holds true in bank-
ruptcy proceedings where debtors must divest assets to reorganize and pay their creditors
as the FCC maintains authority to disapprove of any subsequent transfer, even if the
bankruptcy court ordered such a transfer. See In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 35
B.R. 400,401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
142. In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting S. REP.
No. 95-989 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5869); see 11 U.S.C. §
541(c)(1)(A) (1994); see also In re Polycorp Assocs., Inc., 47 B.R. 671, 672 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1985) (requiring payment of state taxes on liquor licenses if the bankruptcy estate will
eventually transfer the licenses, because such conditions, set forth by agreements, regula-
tions, or non-bankruptcy law only intended to eliminate barriers to the transfer of liquor
licenses to the estate). "[Section] 541(c)(1)(A) is intended to eliminate barriers to the
transfer of property to the estate, and nothing more." Id.
143. See La Rose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also In re Merkley,
94 F.C.C.2d 829, 837 (1983) (noting that in bankruptcy proceedings, the FCC usually con-
sents to the temporary custody of the license by the trustee, and once a qualified purchaser
is found, the license is subject to all the conditions and restrictions put forth in the FCA
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Code overrides only those restrictions that would have prevented
NextWave's bankruptcy estate from acquiring the licenses."'
A bankruptcy petition filing sets aside any action or proceeding, in-
cluding those of the government, unless it is a governmental unit enforc-
ing a regulatory power inherent in the license.14 The NextWave bank-
ruptcy court classified the debt owed to the FCC as a financial interest,
identical to a nonexempt creditor's claim subject to avoidance under the
Bankruptcy Code as opposed to a regulatory condition.' 46
In In re Hoffman, a bankruptcy court determined that the Rhode Is-
land Division of Taxation could not block the sale of a liquor license be-
cause the seller owed outstanding taxes; such a blockage constituted pe-
cuniary interest, rather than a regulatory condition and was "not aimed
at guarding the public safety, health, or welfare."'47 In cases factually
and the FCC's regulations).
144. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 305, 307 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave IV.B). The FCC opposed the remedy provided by the bank-
ruptcy court; it did not oppose the fact that the licenses are subject to the proceedings. See
In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(NextWave VI). The FCC argued that NextWave must either pay the winning bid amount
according to its installment schedule or return the licenses to the FCC. See NextWave
IV.B, 235 B.R. at 308. Case law illustrates that when a debtor's interest in a government
license expires due to an express condition, "the Bankruptcy Code does not preserve that
interest and prevent termination." In re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1262 (1st Cir. 1989).
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (staying claims against the debtor); id. § 362(b)(4) (Supp.
IV 1998) (exempting government regulatory actions from the provisions of § 362(a)). In
order for a governmental unit to enforce conditions associated with the government prop-
erty at issue, and thus receive exemption from the stay, the primary purpose of the gov-
ernmental unit must be to further protect or to conserve the public health, safety, or wel-
fare. See In re Hoffman, 65 B.R. 985, 988 (D. R.I. 1986). Section 362's legislative history
explains that exemptions for governmental proceedings are valid only when the action
taken against the debtor or the property of the estate is "to prevent or stop violation of
fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regula-
tory laws ...." S. REP. No. 95-989, at 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5838; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340, 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297,
6299.
146. In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 314, 315, 318 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave V) (denying the FCC's request for an automatic stay due to its
role as a creditor in the NextWave spectrum auction). In cases where a state seeks to deny
liquor license renewals to bankrupt licensees for outstanding tax debts, some bankruptcy
courts have found that payment of taxes to the state only served to enhance the state's fi-
nancial interests, and not its police power. See generally In re Amasya, 234 B.R. 224
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re J.F.D. Enterprises, Inc., 183 B.R. 342 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1995); In re North 128 B.R. 592 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991). But see supra note 142 and accom-
panying text (citing In re Polycorp Assocs., Inc., whereby tax debt from liquor licenses
could not be avoided because it served a regulatory purpose).
147. In re Hoffman, 65 B.R. at 988 (holding that governmental units cannot invoke a
regulatory power when the purpose for such power is financially motivated to circumvent
the protections afforded to debtors in bankruptcy) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)). The
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similar to Hoffnan, bankruptcy courts have held, however, that although
money was owed to the government, the debt could be enforced due to
the government's regulation of the licenses in question.4  Regarding the
NextWave litigation, the Second Circuit disagreed with Hoffman and de-
termined that the conditions requiring full payment or revocation of the
C-Block licenses serve regulatory purposes within the FCC's jurisdic-
• 49
tion. These conditions, it asserted, enable the Commission to manage
radio spectrum under Congress's guidelines.5
The NextWave bankruptcy court found that the "timely payment"
condition did not serve a regulatory function, but it did implicate a pecu-
niary purpose.'' The court reasoned that canceling a license for failure
to make timely payments only serves to ensure payment to the FCC, and
the FCA prohibits regulations based on the expectation of revenue."'
The Second Circuit, in its NextWave IX opinion, however, held that
whenever the FCC asserts its power to dictate license terms, the action is
regulatory, and the bankruptcy court has no authority to determine its
validity."'
B. The FCC's Dual Role in the C-Block Auction: Regulator and Creditor
Congress intended for the FCA "to maintain the control of the United
Hoffman court determined that the state's Division of Taxation acted as a license holder's
creditor because the only issue to which it objected was the nonpayment of an outstanding
debt. Id. at 988, 989. The court explained that the taxes only created revenue for the
state, and "[i]f the law looks like a revenue collection measure and operates like a revenue
collection measure, the chances are excellent that ... it is indeed a revenue collection
measure." Id. at 989.
148. See, e.g., In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1986).
149. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir.
1999) (NextWave VII), cert. denied., 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980).
The court found that the "full and timely payment of the winning bid" directly related to
the FCC's implementation of spectrum allocation. Id.
150. See id. at 53 (emphasizing that the conditions ensured that the appropriate enti-
ties received the licenses, as outlined by Congress). The FCC determined that the condi-
tions of timely payment in full "would best promote congressional objectives and serve the
public interest." Id.
151. In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 281-82 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NextWave VIII).
152. See id. The court also questioned the credibility of timeliness as a regulatory ne-
cessity by raising the fact that the FCC had reassigned the C and F Block payment dead-
lines on at least two occasions and routinely granted waivers of deadlines. See id. at 281
n.26.
153. In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2000) (NextWave IX) (holding that the
FCC does not have to defend its regulations to the NextWave bankruptcy court, and the
fact that the court found the regulations arbitrary does not authorize bankruptcy law to
alter them), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2000) (No. 00-447).
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States over all the channels of radio transmission." '154 Congress also
mandated that the FCC implement a competitive bidding process to en-
sure efficient use of the spectrum and rapid deployment of new commu-
nications services, promote competition, prevent unjust enrichment, and
recover "a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource." '5 The
FCC regulations that insisted on payment and revoked a spectrum li-
cense in the event of nonpayment promoted these objectives by ensuring
that there were financially stable companies providing the newest serv-
ices to the public at all times.'56 Congress also permitted the FCC to offer
installment plans, similar to those of a lending institution, to encourage
smaller, entrepreneurial providers to enter the market.'57 Although the
Commission was technically a creditor to NextWave, the appeals court
held that any encroachment on its regulatory authority would prevent
the FCC from carrying out Congress's objectives.'58
1. Enforcement of Payment Conditions as a Regulatory Function
The regulations set forth in the FCC's competitive bidding process ac-
complished these congressional objectives by awarding radio spectrum
licenses to the highest bidders, who valued them the most.59 Enforce-
ment of the highest bid, therefore, was inextricably tied to the FCC's
regulatory functions.'O The Commission determined that it was not in
154. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994). Since its inception, the FCC has been "the expert body
which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy." FCC v. Pottsville Broad.
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
155. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)-(D) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also H.R. REP. No.
103-66, at 254-55 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 581-82.
156. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C); 47 C.F.R. § 24.708(a) (1999) (requiring that the
grant of a license by the FCC is conditioned upon full and timely payment of the winning
bid amount); Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2360-61, paras. 70-71.
157. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(13)(C) (1994); Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at
2388, para. 227; 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f) (1999); id. § 24.711(b) (outlining the rules governing
installment payments for qualified bidders). The installment plan was established, in the
spirit of competition set forth in the FCA, to allow small, rural, and minority-owned busi-
nesses to compete for spectrum licenses without having to pay the full bid amount upfront,
as required for other bidders. See id. § 1.2110(f).
158. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 55, 59 (2d Cir.
1999) (NextWave VII), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980);
see also NextWave IX, 217 F.3d at 135.
159. See Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2361, para. 71. (explaining that a
license's value is increased by a bidder who is capable of getting services into the market
quickly and efficiently).
160. See H.R. REP. No. 103-66, at 249 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378,575-
76. Congress found that the comparative hearing and lottery methods of assigning spec-
trum were ineffective at choosing the most qualified licensees and delayed the implemen-
tation of new services to the public because the licenses were given out on the basis of
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the public's best interest to allocate spectrum to companies that could
not afford to pay for licenses because such companies may have poor
quality or nonexistent services. 6' Conversely, companies "with the high-
est willingness to pay" would most likely provide the best services."'
In NextWave VI, the district court emphasized that the FCA mandates
that only "a portion of the current value of the spectrum licenses" be re-
covered from public auctions.1 63  Therefore, NextWave's obligation to
pay the actual value of the licenses $1.023 billion satisfied the statutory
requirement.' 6 The FCC and the appeals court rejected this conclusion,
and asserted that reassessing the licenses' values after a company offers a
price for them would gravely undermine the auction system .
The government further argued that timely payment and enforcement
of the FCC's default rules were also necessary to maintain the integrity
of the auction by serving as a substitute for "detailed credit checks" and
other safeguards normally employed by lending institutions.' 66 The bank-
ruptcy court disagreed with this idea, and stated that the rules governing
the expectation of claims are purely economic and serve no regulatory
purpose. When the FCC cancelled the licenses in January 2000, how-
ever, it relied on the Second Circuit's ruling that the license conditions
were primarily regulatory and argued that the auction would be under-
mined if NextWave could retain the licenses but default on the strict
qualifications that did not necessarily reflect the licensee's ability to use the spectrum effi-
ciently. See id. Congress also found that the old methods created "rampant speculation,
undermined the integrity of the FCC's licensing process and, more importantly, frequently
resulted in unqualified persons winning an FCC license." Id. at 575.
161, See Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2360-61, paras. 70-71 (stating that
relying on competitive market forces to determine the value of spectrum, which is re-
flected in the amount companies are willing to bid, will benefit both consumers and pro-
ducers now and in the future).
162. Id. at 2361, para. 71.
163. In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311, 320 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (NextWave VI).
164. See id. at 318 (explaining that the FCC may not recover more than court-assessed
value of the NextWave licenses); supra note 110 and accompanying text (detailing the
court's ruling on when NextWave became indebted to the Commission).
165. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 60-61 (2d Cir.
1999) (NextWave VII), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980);
Restructuring Order, supra note 92, at 16447, para. 19 (rejecting the proposal to forgive
large portions of the C-Block debt). Members of the Senate agreed with the Commission
and expressed concerns that voiding the winning bids would contradict Congress's goals of
putting spectrum licenses "into the hands of those who value them the most." Id.
166. NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 53; Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2382-83,
paras. 194, 197-98.
167. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 281 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NextWave VIII) (finding that the timeliness condition on the licenses only
serves the FCC in its capacity as a creditor attempting to collect a financial debt).
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payment schedule.1 6
The bankruptcy courts, however, found that the revenues generated by
the spectrum auctions served a purely fiscal purpose, and subjected the
Commission to the Bankruptcy Code, regardless of its regulatory func-
tion.169 The bankruptcy court further held that the FCC's refusal to re-
duce the price of the licenses and its enforcement of payment deadlines
and penalties supported the presumption that revenue was the Commis-
sion's primary concern.7 ° The appeals court, however, agreed with the
FCC and found that notwithstanding the monetary component of the
auction, the regulatory aims of the auction program hinged upon the re-
liability of the winning bids."'
2. If it Walks Like a Creditor and Talks Like a Creditor...
The FCC concluded that despite its collection of license revenues, it
did not function as a commercial entity because management of the in-
stallment plans is a regulatory charge mandated by the FCA.17 1 The
Commission distinguished itself from the average creditor by arguing
that each license allocation is not "a custom-made, hand-tailored, specifi-
168. See Cancellation Notice, supra note 25.
169. See NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 315-16. In NextWave V, the court required the FCC
to comply with the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding the fact that the regulations called
for payment or subsequent revocation. In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc.,
235 B.R. 314, 315-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave V). The bankruptcy court ad-
hered to the theory that because the FCC was a creditor, all of its regulations were essen-
tially moot, the conditions on the licenses were immaterial, and the "FCC's own regula-
tions [we]re entitled to no more nor less weight in the context of bankruptcy proceedings
than the contractual notes, mortgages and similar documents" subject to modification by
bankruptcy law. Id. at 317.
170. See NextWave VIII, 244 B.R. at 274 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the
FCC's actions were pecuniary and thus subject to the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)).
171. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 52, 53; see also Second Report and Order, supra
note 8, at 2361, paras. 72-73 (rejecting the view that an auction designed to get the highest
price for spectrum licenses is only intended to maximize the government's revenue collec-
tions). Although recovering revenue from the licenses is within the legislative intent of
the FCA, the Commission maintains that it is not the sole purpose or goal in the auction.
See id. at 2361, 2373; see also 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Again, the
goal of rapid deployment of services and efficient use of the spectrum is achievable by as-
signing the licenses to those who value them the most because those who value them the
most will bid and pay the highest for them. See Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at
2361, paras. 72-73. The court in In re D.H. Overmyer agreed and determined that the al-
location of spectrum licenses remains "an exercise of the government's plenary power
over the public airwaves," despite the revenues raised thereby. In re D.H. Overmyer, 35
B.R. 400, 404 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 1983).
172. See NextWave V, 235 B.R. at 316-17; NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 321.
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cally negotiated transaction" with the individual licensee.173 Congress di-
rected the Commission to utilize payment procedures that would prevent
the agency from having to evaluate fully each bidder's financial merits
and protect the agency from assuming the risks that are appropriately
borne by the bidder and its financial backers.' The Second Circuit, in
the first appeals opinion, disagreed with the lower courts and explained
that Congress directed the FCC to design an auction system to promote
the most effective use of the spectrum, not to maximize revenue for the
government by selling spectrum.'75 The appeals court also stated that the
FCC's auctioning of spectrum served the same regulatory functions as
the former methods of allocation, but it did so in a more efficient man-
ner.'76 The appeals court held that if the FCC acted as a creditor by col-
lecting installment payments, it did so while carrying out its regulatory
duties."'
173. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant FCC at 16, NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 311
(concluding that given the large number of bidders, and the uncertainty regarding the fi-
nancial status of any bidder prior to an auction's completion, the FCC cannot conduct a
meaningful financial analysis for each license applicant). Commissioner Susan Ness re-
marked that the FCC "never performed the banker's role ... of reviewing the bidders'
balance sheets, their business plans, the wisdom of their planned bids, and the quality of
their management." Reconsideration Order, supra note 98, at 8393 (Statement of Com-
missioner Susan Ness). The agency instead relies, for the most part, on the strict enforce-
ment of its rules, to discourage default, and to ensure that bidders can afford to finance
their use of the valuable spectrum. See Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2383,
para. 198.
174. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, at 399, 483 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1172. Congress believed that the FCC should not allocate licenses
based on speculation of a bidder's future financial success as a licensee, as would an aver-
age creditor, because it would assume a large litigation risk and essentially create an inef-
ficient system. See id.; H.R. REP. 103-111, at 255 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
at 582; see also Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2382-83, para. 197. In addition,
the FCC explained that due to the public notice requirements on the post-auction applica-
tions, the C-Block license creditors had ample information as to the final bid amounts and
an opportunity to examine the financial records of the companies they underwrote. See
Memorandum in Support of FCC's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 10, In re
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 277 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(NextWave IVA). The Commission, therefore, reasoned that it is not responsible for any
risks taken by the bidders or creditors. See id.
175. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 52.
176. See id. at 52, 53 (explaining that competitive auctions, compared to free license
allocation, better ensure spectrum productivity, but asserting that "the FCA draws no
categorical distinctions among ... [a] comparative hearing lottery and auction").
177. See id. at 51-53, 59 (inferring that the FCC is not an ordinary commercial actor
when auctioning and collecting payment on spectrum licenses and finding that the bank-
ruptcy court's ruling that the FCC was only a creditor in the NextWave transaction may
have ignored the dual role it played in the C-Block auction); see also Second Report and
Order, supra note 8, at 2350, para. 7, 2382-83, para. 7 (explaining that it is "critically im-
portant to the success" of the competitive auction program to enforce revocation, which
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The lower courts in the NextWave decisions declared that the FCC's
transfers of the licenses and accompanying actions in instituting the li-
censes were characteristic of a creditor in a classic commercial transac-
tion.1 78  This interpretation rejected the principle that the financial
agreement between the FCC and a bidder had any relation to the organi-
zation, execution, or implementation of the auctions, and instead saw the
agreement to bear only on the creditor-debtor relationship. 79 Further,
the bankruptcy court pointed out that although Congress intended for
the FCC to be a creditor in allocating the C-Block licenses, neither the
FCA nor the Bankruptcy Code contained language that expressly gave
enables the FCC to ensure that the public spectrum is being used efficiently on behalf of
the public at large pursuant to the congressional mandate set forth by the FCA). Nowhere
in any of the NextWave cases does the Commission deny that it is a creditor. See generally
supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the NextWave decisions). FCC Commis-
sioner Michael Powell stated that the Commission can be forced into a role as "both credi-
tor and government agent." 3 FCC Commissioners Defend Wireless Auction Process,
COMM. DAILY, Sept. 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 7580438. In the same conversation,
FCC Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth admitted "that playing creditor to license
bidders isn't a statutory requirement for [the] Commission" and that the agency should
not play the role of a creditor. Id.
178. E.g., In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311,316 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (NextWave VI) (finding that the regulations addressing payment and default amount
to contracts between a debtor and a creditor). The district court also characterized the
FCC's restructuring orders as "voluntary offers of a creditor to protect the solvency of its
debtor in order to assure payment." Id. A creditor is defined as "[olne to whom a debt is
owed," "[o]ne to whom any obligation is owed, whether contractual or otherwise," and a
"person or entity that having a claim against the debtor predating the order for relief con-
cerning the debtor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 375 (6th ed. 1990). The Bankruptcy
Code defines creditor as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the
time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A)
(1994). The NextWave VI court further explained that the Commission is "a creditor who
happens to be a federal agency" that voluntarily lends, has the power to set the agree-
ments, and complies with the Bankruptcy Code. NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 316 (quoting
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 736 (1979)). The Kimbell case is dis-
tinguishable, however, from the instant cases because there the Court considered the gov-
ernment's detailed knowledge of the debtor's financial status and examined the creditor's
other interests. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 736. The FCC did not have such knowl-
edge of NextWave or any other bidders. Cf. Second Report and Order, supra note 8, at
2376-77, para. 166, 2380, para. 183.
179. See, e.g., NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 321 (affirming that the regulations prescribing
debt collection and revocation "are not part of the auction process; they are the FCC's
rules governing its status as a creditor of licensees"); see also In re NextWave Personal
Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 263, 270 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (NextWave I). Support
for this interpretation is found in two similar cases where the FDIC claimed it acted in a
regulatory capacity by attempting to collect on obligations owed by debtors to a failed
bank. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 225 (1997); FDIC v. Condit, 861 F.2d 853, 854
(5th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit examined the FDIC's roles as
insurer and creditor; both courts held that the FDIC did not promote government interests
in a regulatory capacity. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 225; Condit, 861 F.2d at 858.
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the Commission additional rights in such capacity.'8° Thus, the bank-
ruptcy court maintained that the agency sat in the same position as a pri-
vate creditor, which rendered it equally subject to prevailing bankruptcy
law .
Despite the Second Circuit's opinion, the bankruptcy court relied on
the same argument to nullify the cancellation of the licenses in January
2000." 2 The court clung to the theory that the FCC was merely a creditor
seeking to recover a claim against NextWave, and held in NextWave VIII
that the Commission was subject to the automatic stay under the Bank-
ruptcy Code."83
3. Regulatory Power Under the Bankruptcy Code: The FCC's
Exemption from the Automatic Stay
The FCC based its cancellation of NextWave's licenses on the com-
pany's failure to meet its installment deadlines."4 The Commission con-
tended that enforcement of payment deadlines served the same regula-
tory function as enforcement of the winning bid, which the appeals court
confirmed.18 The FCC claimed that its regulatory power to enforce
mandated public policy objectives allowed it to automatically cancel the
licenses notwithstanding the stay.'
180. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 314, 317 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave V) (rejecting the Commission's explanation that the language
directing the agency to govern the auction process, including the installment plans, ex-
empts the FCC from the bankruptcy remedy).
181. See id. at 317; cf. Kimball Foods, 440 U.S. at 737 (holding that when an agency
acts as a lender it "is in substantially the same position as private lenders"). The Supreme
Court stated that Congress advised the government to be judicious in its loan programs so
as to protect particular government units from bankruptcy proceedings. See id.
182. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 276 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NextWave VIII) ("The FCC must, like other creditors, go through the
[reorganization] plan process and have its claim administered under the bankruptcy
code.").
183. Id. at 266, 267, 271 (finding that the FCC cancelled the licenses because
NextWave failed to pay for a pre-petition claim while it was in bankruptcy). The FCC ar-
gued that its action did not violate the automatic stay within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. See id. at 271.
184. See FCC Objection to Modified Plan, supra note 25, at *3 n.al (explaining that
NextWave failed to meet the October 29,1998 deadline).
185. See id. (emphasizing that PCS licenses automatically cancel unless payment is
made in full and on time); see also In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2000) (NextWave
IX) (explaining that the full and timely payment requirements obviously serve the same
regulatory purpose), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2000) (No. 00-
447).
186. See Cancellation Notice, supra note 25; FCC Objection to Modified Plan, supra
note 25; see also In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir
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The bankruptcy court rejected this assertion, and reasoned that the
government had only financial incentives."' The court further found that
the exemption under the automatic stay did not apply to the FCC's ac-
tions because they were strictly pecuniary in nature and did not promote
a police or regulatory policy."" The court justified enforcement of the
stay by reasoning that while payment in full may be regulatory, all pro-
cedural issues of payment-namely timeliness-are governed by the
Commission's creditor function because "[nlo rational explanation ha[d]
been offered" to the contrary.'89 However, the Second Circuit overruled
the stay, holding that timeliness was indeed a regulatory requirement and
that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to review the validity of
FCC regulations.' 9
C. A Difference in Interpretation Leads to a Conflict of Laws
Resolution of the present impasse between the federal government
and the bankrupt C-Block licensees necessitated an assessment of the
opposing FCA interpretations in relation to the FCC's dual role as credi-
tor and regulator. 91 Such resolution also involved examining legislative
intent and public interest within these two areas of law in light of the
avoidance remedy and automatic stay established by the bankruptcy
court, and whether the inherent conflict between the two could be har-
1999) (NextWave VII) (explaining that promotion of the public interest is the purpose be-
hind the FCC default rules and penalties), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10,
2000) (No. 99-1980).
187. See NextWave VIII, 244 B.R. at 274 (holding that the regulatory premise asserted
by the FCC is simply a guise to enforce a financial default by its debtor). The court ruled
that the license cancellations were strictly claim-based, only effecting the government's
role as a creditor applying collection penalties. See id. at 267.
188. See id. at 273, 274 (explaining that the automatic stay is narrow in scope and does
not apply to government actions that seek to recover money).
189. Id. at 281. The ruling also cited that the December appeals court decision did not
address timeliness. See id. at 283.
190. See NextWave IX, 217 F.3d at 135-39. The appeals court maintained that the
bankruptcy court inappropriately enforced the automatic stay based on its finding that the
license regulations were arbitrary. See id. at 137.
191. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 263, 269 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998) (NextWave I) (stating that "[tJhe task ... is to determine whether the
claims asserted against the FCC by NextWave affect NextWave" through the agency's role
as a creditor or regulator). Judge Adlai S. Hardin, Jr., of the Bankruptcy Court of the
Southern District of New York, who issued several rulings in NextWave, commented that
the FCC's case depends on the conclusion that the agency is somehow exempt from bank-
ruptcy laws despite its role as a creditor. See FCC Wins Stay in NextWave Bankruptcy
Proceeding, MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS REP., Sept. 6, 1999, available in 1999 WL
8752919.
2000]
Catholic University Law Review
monized.
9 2
1. Disagreement on the Scope of the FCC's Regulatory Power. Where
Does the Buck Stop?
The underlying principle in the Second Circuit's analysis was that en-
forcement of the license conditions constituted an implementation of an
FCA mandate.'9 The appeals court held that regardless of the bank-
ruptcy court's interpretation of the FCC's actions, the Commission's own
interpretation of its regulations must be given deference.'94  Likewise, a
court cannot perform a function expressly mandated to an agency. ' 9'
This holding supports the position that the statute need not address the
FCC's status in bankruptcy courts with regard to the auction process be-
cause regulations, according to the Bankruptcy Code, are not subject to
conflicting bankruptcy actions.9 6 The government further reasoned that
Congress mandated that the FCC act in its regulatory function as a credi-
tor in order to afford competitive opportunities to small businesses.' 97
The Commission did not act as a traditional lender, but as a licensing
agency charged with allocating licenses, and set payment terms applica-
192. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311, 319 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (NextWave VI) (referring to the bankruptcy court's three page delineation of how
the avoidance remedy meets the policy and statutory objectives of the FCA and the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
193. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 52, 54-55 & n.10
(2d Cir. 1999) (NextWave VII), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-
1980); 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(13)(C) (1994) (mandating the implementation of license payment
on installments); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2110(f)(4), 24.708(a) (1999) (listing rules for the
installment program).
194. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 58 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). It can be argued that the differences of opinion on the reading of
the FCA succumb to the notion that the court must accept the FCC's interpretation of the
statute as long as it reasonably advances the integrity and fairness of the auction process.
See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999). Regulations ensure
that the statutes are applied properly. See id. (stating that "[d]eference to an agency's ex-
pertise in construing a statutory command" should not be disregarded).
195. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 53-54 ("'[N]o court can grant an applicant an
authorization which the Commission has refused."' (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio v.
FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942))).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing an automatic stay exemption for
governmental units that enforce regulatory or police powers); see United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 604 (1973) (stating that if the rights of the federal
government are at issue in a contract, no rule may be applied, which would not be wholly
in accord with that program); In re Hoffman, 65 B.R. 985, 991 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1986)
(holding that "if the objective of the state law can reasonably be viewed as 'not so much
one of priority of claims as one of defining the nature of the bankrupt's property to which
the claims attach,"' it will withstand the Supremacy Clause).
197. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 46.
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ble to all C-Block licensees.'"
The bankruptcy court argued that the monetary aspects of the license
allocation were separate and distinct from the regulations.99 The court
found that the enforcement of the agreement was the FCC creating its
own rights as a creditor to the detriment of all other creditors, not the
FCC regulating spectrum licensing.0 If Congress had intended to endow
the Commission with such a privilege, the court maintained, it would
have amended the Code or the FCA.' °' Therefore, the court reasoned,
the FCC's enforcement power was not implicated and like any other
government creditor, the agency should have complied strictly with the
Bankruptcy Code.
198. See Restructuring Order, supra note 92, at 16,513 (separate statement of Commis-
sioner Susan Ness) (explaining that the FCC's primary responsibilities are writing fair
rules, running fair auctions, and issuing licenses to winning bidders). In the same pro-
ceeding, Chairman Reed E. Hundt warned that bankruptcy litigation would impede Con-
gress's intent to utilize the spectrum because of the inevitable cost in time and money. See
id. at 16,507 (affirming and dissenting separate statement of Chairman Reed E. Hundt).
199. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 314, 315-317
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave V) (holding that Congress conferred upon the FCC the
dual roles of regulator and creditor).
200. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 263, 270 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y 1998) (NextWave I). The court argued strongly that Congress never conferred
this right upon the Commission. See id. The court argued that cancellation removes the
licenses from the estate, and consequently robs the other creditors from reclamation of
their investments. See id. Nothing in the FCA or Bankruptcy Code granted any rights to
the FCC as a creditor that would render it superior to or different from other creditors
participating in the deal. See NextWave V, 235 B.R. at 316.
201. Cf NextWave V, 235 B.R. at 316. Specific transactions in several government
agencies are exempt from bankruptcy law. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Since the initial C-Block bankruptcy filing, there has been legislation presented to Con-
gress expressly exempting the Commission from the Bankruptcy Code. See Balanced
Budget Act FY 2000, S. 1217, 106 Cong. § 618 (1999). Section 618 of the Appropriations
bill would have amended § 3090) of the FCA, exempting the FCC's regulation of spec-
trum licenses and the holders' obligations under the licenses from insolvency laws includ-
ing bankruptcy. See id. However, the language was not included in the final version of the
bill. See H.R.J Res. 82, 106 Cong. (1999); Fate of NextWave's Spectrum Echoes in Hall-
ways of Congress, WIRELESS TODAY, Nov. 18, 1999, available in 1999 WL 6692264. In
September 2000, a provision allowing the FCC to reclaim licenses from bankrupt wireless
companies was pending in a Senate appropriations bill. See Jeffrey Silva, Lawmakers Put
Telecom Legislation on Hold for August Recess, RCR RADIO COMM. REP., July 31, 2000,
available in 2000 WL 9541941. This legislation is not the first of its kind. Examples in-
clude the "Health Education Assistance Loans, HUD mortgages, ship mortgages under
the Merchant Marine Act, debts for taxes and customs duties, and licensure on educa-
tional institutions." Letter from Jon Jennings, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, to the Honorable William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC (Oct. 5, 1999) (on file with
Catholic University Law Review).
202. See NextWave V, 235 B.R. at 316, 317. Because the district court found no regula-
tory provisions of the FCA affected, it deduced that federal bankruptcy law was necessar-
2000]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:219
2. The Bankruptcy Remedies Conflict with the FCA's Purposes
The Federal Communications Act states that "[n]othing ... in the use
of competitive bidding, shall... diminish the authority of the [FCC]...
to regulate or reclaim spectrum licenses."2 °3 The Commission claimed
that the remedies that the bankruptcy court provided to NextWave vio-
lated this statutory language.""
Essentially, the bankruptcy court's judgment was "at war with the ba-
sic policy underlying the [FCA]" because it emasculated the very system
Congress chose to promote: an efficient and effective use of spectrum
within a competitive market.05 The lower courts' disregard for the win-
ning bid and unwillingness to return the licenses for reauction prevented
rapid development of services by companies that valued the spectrum the
most.
216
ily applicable, relying on examples of other federal lending programs subject to similar
adjudication. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311, 316
(S.D.N.Y 1999) (NextWave VI) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 106(a), which provides that the federal
agencies are subject to fraudulent conveyance claims). The court also explains that the
remedy in this case is mandated by law. See In re NextWave Personal Communications,
Inc., 235 B.R. 305, 311 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave IV.B). Historically, the Su-
preme Court has admonished courts to refrain from electing its own remedies when the
governing statute provides the answer. See, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S.
479, 487-88 (1996); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979).
203. 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(6) (1994).
204. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir.
2000) (NextWave VII), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980);
NextWave IV.B, 235 B.R. at 307; NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 269, 270. By classifying the FCC
as just an ordinary creditor with rights limited to those of a private lender, the NextWave
court disregarded the Commission's regulatory responsibilities and the objectives Con-
gress enacted in the FCA. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 55, 56. A remedy such as the
one imposed by the bankruptcy court, which is completely at odds with the FCC licensing
regulations-much less "wholly in accord" with them-is barred under federal common
law. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 604 (1973) (asserting that
if the rights of the federal government are at issue in a contract pertaining to a federal
program, any rules applied to such contract must be "wholly in accord" with that pro-
gram).
205. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1940) (holding that Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's finding that the FCC made legal errors in its
denial of a radio license does not give the appeals court authority to then approve such
license); NextWave I, 235 B.R. at 271; NextWave IV.B., 235 B.R. at 307, 308; NextWave V,
235 B.R. at 317. The winning bids are the bases upon which the government allocates
scarce spectrum among competing companies, and revocation of the licenses upon default
of such bids are regulations that ensure the fairness and efficiency of the license scheme, as
indicated by the FCA. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1), (3), (4), (6) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Sec-
ond Report and Order, supra note 8, at 2360, para. 70.
206. See Cancellation Notice, supra note 25 (quoting FCC Chairman William Ken-
nard's declaration that the spectrum for which NextWave is licensed "has laid fallow for
too long"). Kennard warned that the public suffers a loss when companies are financially
unable to utilize their allotted spectrum to its fullest capacity. See Senate Hearing, supra
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Secondly, by virtue of the statute, the court had no authority to change
an essential condition of the licenses.0 7 Congress conferred exclusive
authority on the FCC, not the courts, to grant spectrum licenses based on
regulations that would protect the public interest.9 By letting
NextWave keep sixty-three licenses for seventy-five percent less than it
bid for them, the bankruptcy court usurped the Commission's power and
granted rights to NextWave to which the company is not entitled under
the FCA.2 9 Similarly, by allowing NextWave to retain the licenses with-
out adhering to the deadlines imposed on every other licensee, the court
again granted license rights without statutory authority.
21°
note 25 (statement of FCC Chairman William Kennard); Jeffrey Silva & Heather Forsgren
Weaver, FCC, DOJ: Pocket Licenses Must Come Back, RCR RADIO COMM. REP., Oct.
26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21947866.
207. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 54, 56 (prohibiting the bankruptcy court from at-
tacking or impairing the FCC's license allocation system); In re Pacific Land Sales, Inc.,
187 B.R. 302, 313 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has held that courts cannot
grant an applicant a license that the FCC has refused. See FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S.
223,229 (1946); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942). Because Con-
gress has expressly granted the FCC exclusive jurisdiction over the airwaves, it remains
that "the Commission, not the courts, . . . must be satisfied that the public interest will be
served" by the grant of the license. See WOKO, 329 U.S. at 229.
208. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 55 & n.l (stating that the bankruptcy court has no
power to adjudicate claims against the FCC as a regulator). The bankruptcy court had
neither "technical competence nor legal authority" to reach the conclusion that the FCA's
public interest goals would be promoted through the avoidance remedy. National Broad.
Co., v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943). The determination of what policies consti-
tute the public interest in relation to radio spectrum allocation is a task that Congress has
given to the Commission. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596
(1981).
209. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
502 (1986) ("Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the
[bankruptcy] trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore non bankruptcy law."). The
Supreme Court has also held that a debtor in bankruptcy is not relieved of all pre-petition
obligations under nonbankruptcy law simply because the debtor seeks refuge from the
Bankruptcy Code. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 534 (1984). Even
bankruptcy courts have operated under the canon that the Bankruptcy Code cannot
change the "regulatory environment in which a debtor operates." In re Draughon Train-
ing Inst., Inc., 119 B.R. 921, 924 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1990); see also In re Capital West Inves-
tors, 186 B.R. 497, 500-01 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) (reversing the bankruptcy court's order
confirming a reorganization plan that removed certain financial requirements from the
debtor's regulatory agreement with the Federal Housing and Urban Development
Agency); In re Nitech Paper Corp., 43 B.R. 492, 499 n.7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The Su-
preme Court has indicated several situations where the bankruptcy code must bend in the
face of contrary federal policy.").
210. See In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125,128-29,131-32 (2d Cir. 2000) (NextWave IX), petition
for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2000) (No. 00-447); NextWave VII, 200 F.3d
at 55, 56 (noting that the NextWave bankruptcy court does not have the power to interfere
with the FCC's implementation of congressional objectives); see also 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(3) (1994) (authorizing a court to confirm a plan of reorganization only if it is "not
2000]
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Thirdly, waiving cancellation of NextWave's licenses unfairly discrimi-
nated against those C-Block licensees who played by the rules."' The
FCA specifically directs the FCC to allocate spectrum so as not to create
unjust enrichment or additional rights for any licensee, regardless of any
212other statutory protections. Therefore, adhering to the conditions of
the licenses allows for consistent implementation of the FCA's public
policy goals."3
3. Enforcement of the Bankruptcy Code Promotes Federal Policy
To provide equitable relief to NextWave's creditors and assistance for
the company, the lower courts allowed NextWave to ignore the balance
of the bid owed to the government."' The bankruptcy court explained
that NextWave's debt represented a payment obligation to the FCC as a
creditor, and because there was no express provision exempting the FCC
as a creditor from bankruptcy proceedings, Congress intended such debt
to be avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code just like any other financial
obligation."5 The district and bankruptcy courts rejected the argument
that their remedies ignored the Communications Act, finding that the
Commission's regulations governing spectrum licenses were not altered
in any way."'
by any means forbidden by law"). It is worth noting that when a debtor licensee attempts
to limit the discretion of a regulatory body through bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor
licensee could enhance its own property rights, which is contrary to the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code. See In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 35 B.R. 400, 404 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1983).
211. See Cancellation Notice, supra note 25 (quoting FCC Chairman William E. Ken-
nard as stating that discretionary treatment toward NextWave would be unfair and un-
dermine the auction process).
212. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(E), (6)(D) (1994).
213. See Senate Hearing, supra note 25 (statement of FCC Chairman William Ken-
nard).
214. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311, 319-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave VI). The Bankruptcy Code promotes pubic policy through
equitable distribution of the assets amongst all creditors, and through any relief that can
encourage reorganization. See In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1996).
215. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 314, 316-17 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave V); In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R.
263,270-71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (NextWave I).
216. See NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 318. NextWave and the court maintain that the
only FCC interest affected is the monetary loss the government will sustain as a creditor.
See id. at 315, 320-21; see also In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R.
253, 274 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NextWave VIII). The court distinguishes the Commis-
sion's supporting case law in In re Yellow Cab Cooperative. Ass'n, 132 F.3d 591, 593-94
(10th Cir. 1997) (holding that municipal agency's regulatory power allowed modification
of a bankrupt company's taxi cab license included as an asset in the estate) and In re Gull
Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1260, 1262 (1st Cir. 1989) (denying bankruptcy transfer of FAA
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The same court further held that any FCC action to enforce payment
or reclamation of NextWave's licenses was categorically claim based and
therefore stayed under the Bankruptcy Code to enable the company's
recovery and protect its creditors.2 7 Reorganization is strongly favored
over dissolution because it is in the public interest to protect, among
2181many other things, jobs and the economy.
4. But Does the NextWave IX Ruling Harmonize the Competing
Laws?
The district court in NextWave VI acknowledged that "in construing
conflicting statutes, the statutes must be read to harmonize and preserve
the goals" of each.219 When determining a remedy under two federal
statutes, courts must give both equal credence to the congressional in-
tent, for courts should avoid declaring which law is superior.2
Case law has held that "courts are bound by congressional judgments
that general bankruptcy policy give way to more specific policy consid-
erations. 221  The Second Circuit in NextWave VII echoed this view and
asserted that the NextWave courts could not interfere with the congres-
sional goals mandated by the FCA.22 The reduction of NextWave's obli-
gation and disregard for the payment conditions undermined an integral
element of the auction, and thus abrogated the FCA's payment provi-
regulated airport slots because they were revoked from bankrupt licensee), by noting that
the government in all of these cases is not, contrary to the FCC's position in the instant
case, seeking to protect a pecuniary interest. See id.
217. See generally NextWave VIII, 244 B.R. at 266-68, 281-83.
218. See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d at 565.
219. NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 319 (citing the same principle in Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)); In re Betty Owen Schools, Inc., 195 B.R. 23, 33 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reconciling bankruptcy law with the Department of Education's school
loan program); see also In re University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1082-83 (3rd Cir. 1992);
In re Capital West Investors, 186 B.R. 497, 499 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("When confronted with
two different statutory schemes, the court must attempt to harmonize the goals and poli-
cies of each.").
220. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 551 (holding that when two statutes are capable of coexis-
tence, the courts must regard each as applicable, unless Congress expressly intended to
supplant one over the other); see also West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Com-
peting statutes should not, if at all possible, be interpreted so that the provisions of one
will abrogate the provisions of another.").
221. Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 1984); see also
United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (holding that a bankruptcy court cannot
discharge a debt that Congress intended to be nondischargable under the Internal Reve-
nue Code).
222. In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1999)
(NextWave VII) (referring to Justice Frankfurter's observation that the Communications
Act represents Congress's desire to maintain the radio airwaves through administrative
control), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980).
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sions.
The bankruptcy court refuted the FCC's claim and determined that in
addition to promoting its own policy of providing a fresh start for bank-
rupt companies, allowing NextWave to keep the licenses facilitates a re-
organization plan that meets all the objectives set forth in section 309(j)
of the Communications Act.224 The bankruptcy court allowed an entre-
preneurial company to stay in business, contribute to the economy, and
utilize the spectrum faster than a future licensee who would be delayed
by a reauction."'
The Commission, however, contended that regardless of the possibility
that the remedy's effect would be in line with the FCA's goals, returning
the licenses to the FCC would be the only equitable relief to reconcile
the conflicting policies within the FCA and the Bankruptcy Code.226 The
government argued that the bankruptcy court "'failed to recognize that
the potential benefits of allowing NextWave to reorganize pale in com-
parison with the negative ramifications that follow from permitting spec-
trum licensees to avoid critical provisions of their regulatory agreements
with the FCC by declaring bankruptcy.' ' 227 The Second Circuit's opinion
in NextWave IX harmonized congressional intent in both laws when it
223. Cf. In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 305, 307 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave IV.B) (citing the FCC's claim that the bankruptcy court's rem-
edy for NextWave must honor the principle of enforcing the winning bid).
224. See id. at 311. The bankruptcy court maintained that in keeping with the central
canon of bankruptcy law, the remedy will allow NextWave to reorganize rather than liqui-
date. See id. at 312. The bankruptcy court reasoned that the faster NextWave gets on its
feet, the quicker creditors, including the Commission, will be compensated. See In re
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 276 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(NextWave VIII). The court further explained that NextWave's retention of the licenses
and subsequent reentry into the marketplace will promote the FCA's goals by: (1) re-
moving delays that are associated with the administrative and judicial oversight required
for repossessing and reauctioning licenses; (2) promoting economic opportunities for the
public in the form of jobs, tax revenues, and new services; (3) functioning and succeeding
as a competitive small business in the telecommunications market; and (4) promoting the
"efficient and intensive use" of the spectrum, rather than allowing it to remain fallow and
unused. NextWave IV.B, 235 B.R. at 311.
225. See NextWave IV.B, 235 B.R. at 311-12.
226. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311, 319 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (NextWave VI); In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 314, 316
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave V) (arguing that the payment conditions are the key-
stone of the FCC's auction program); see also Senate Hearing, supra note 25 (statement of
FCC Chairman William Kennard) (explaining that strict adherence to the payment condi-
tions will ensure that the licenses remain with companies that will promote the most effec-
tive use of the spectrum); Cancellation Notice, supra note 25 (noting that the C-Block li-
censes set aside by bankruptcy have remained fallow for too long and need to be re-
auctioned for immediate use).
227. NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 319.
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reconciled the FCC's power under the FCA with the Bankruptcy Code's
automatic stay exemption for the exercise of such power.228 Yet it is im-
portant to examine the impact of the Second Circuit's May 2000 ruling in
light of the public policy conflicts espoused by both sides.
III. EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S MANDAMUS
The Commission feared that NextWave's retention of the licenses
would result in a financial burden for taxpayers, devaluation of a public
resource, and an unnatural disruption of the wireless PCS market.229
Conversely, NextWave and the bankruptcy court believed that any ruling
in favor of the FCC would result in destruction of NextWave's and other
bankrupt licensees' rights under the bankruptcy law.230  The result in
NextWave IX mirrored the Second Circuit's conclusions in the preceding
appeal, and reiterated the proposition that regardless of the bankruptcy
court's interpretation of the FCC's actions, the lower court was without
jurisdiction to question whether or not such actions serve a regulatory
231purpose.
A. A Ruling for the FCC Avoids Destructive Precedent
The Commission's chief concern was that a ruling affirming the bank-
ruptcy court's enforcement of the automatic stay would effectively un-
dermine the integrity of the entire auction process.232 The Commission
argued that without FCC regulatory requirements in place, unsuitable
auction participants might pledge billions of dollars for spectrum licenses
with neither the ability nor the intention to pay for them.233 Under such
228. See In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 134-39, 141 (2d Cir. 2000) (NextWave IX), petition
for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2000) (No. 00-447).
229. See FCC Restructuring Order, supra note 92, at 16,447, para. 19 (announcing that
the Commission will not allow bankruptcy licensees to retain their licenses without obliga-
tion to the full bid price because such action would be contrary to the purpose of awarding
licenses to the highest bidders).
230. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 266, 268-70
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NextWave VIII) (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code's provi-
sions are NextWave's right to cure defaults in order to avoid forfeiture and reorganize);
NextWave Statement, supra note 25 ("The FCC has violated the legal rights of NextWave.
..."). The bankruptcy court further stipulated that "[ilf the statutory right to cure were
not honored and the FCC were permitted to reclaim NextWave's licenses ... the result
would be economic catastrophe" for the company and its investors. NextWave VIH, 244
B.R. at 269.
231. NextWave IX, 217 F.3d at 135, 137.
232. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311, 319 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NextWave V).
233. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 241 B.R. 311, 319 (S.D.N.Y)
(NextWave VI); see also In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 52
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circumstances, the FCC's auction program could not reliably award li-
censes to parties that value them most highly 234 and would disrupt the
free market forces built into the current system.
235
Presumably, auction participants could bid phantom amounts, in hopes
that a bankruptcy court would subsequently allow them to defer payment
until they were financially stable.236 The automatic stay and chapter 11
remedies could become an insurance policy for debtors and their under-
writers.' Such a result is highly unfair to those bidders who, with good
intention, bid what they can afford and play by the rules.23' The Commis-
sion could not have been more forthcoming in providing the public with
detailed guidelines to the auction program provisions . It would be na
've to assume that NextWave and the other bankrupt C-Block licensees
had any less knowledge of the potential risks involved than their coun-
terparts who have successfully used their licenses.""
In structuring the auction program, Congress and the FCC intended to
let the market dictate the value of the licenses and allow the bidder to
(2d Cir. 2000) (NextWave VII) (explaining that the FCC "gave considerable thought..."
to deterring frivolous or insincere bidding when it promulgated regulations requiring full
and timely payment of winning bids), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000)
(No. 99-1980).
234. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 54; Restructuring Order, supra note 92, at 16,447,
para. 19 (stating that allowing companies to keep their licenses without paying their full
bid price would result in "the Commission picking winners and losers on an unsupportable
basis, instead of the marketplace determining winners" based on how much they valued
the licenses).
235. See Restructuring Order, supra note 92, at 16,510 (separate statement of FCC
Commissioner Susan Ness) (concluding that the FCC's suspension of C-Block payments
created marketplace uncertainty and impeded investment that was needed to support the
building of PCS systems).
236. See NextWave VI, 241 B.R. at 320 (suggesting that such a plan is not good busi-
ness). Between March 1997 and October 1999, 29 C-Block licensees filed for bankruptcy.
See Department of Justice Letter from Jon Jennings, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
United States Dep't of Justice, to the Honorable William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC
(Oct. 5, 1999) (on file with Catholic University Law Review).
237. See, e.g., Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 849 n.16 (9th Cir. 1988) (asserting that ab-
sent any limits on suing for fraudulent conveyance, "[c]redit could liberally be extended to
such companies regardless of their assets or cash flow with the knowledge that the [trans-
action] could always be [challenged]" in court).
238. See Restructuring Order, supra note 92, at 16,447, para. 19; Cancellation Notice,
supra note 25.
239. See Restructuring Order, supra note 92, at 16,508-10 (separate statement of Com-
missioner Susan Ness) (asserting that the auction rules were clear and fair).
240. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 45, 61-62 (2d Cir.
1999) (NextWave VII), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-1980);
cf Spectrum Report, supra note 8, at 9605 (highlighting the fact that the FCC's dissemina-
tion of auction information to the public has been a successful component of the pro-
gram).
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make the ultimate decision.24' Instead, with the NextWave case, a bank-
ruptcy court determined the price of the licenses, arguably without ex-
pertise in the PCS market.4 ' Further, bidders who ultimately lost in the
auction may have had bids higher than the price NextWave will be pay-
ing. The appeals court recognized these pitfalls when it reversed the
fraudulent conveyance ruling.243 Thus, if the Second Circuit had allowed
the bankruptcy court to stay the FCC's cancellation order, the Commis-
sion and Congress would inevitably be back to the arbitrary allocation
system they sought to change in section 309(j) of the FCA.2" In addition,
enforcement of the stay would allow NextWave to be unjustly enriched,
which Congress expressly prohibits in the Act.245
B. Implications: The Communications Industry and the Public
Also of concern is the public trust element of the spectrum auction.246
Policy makers, along with the FCC, feared that taxpayers would bear the
brunt of the litigation: picking up the outstanding multibillion dollar bill
on the C-Block licenses and losing out on the promise of efficient, inno-
247
vative, and cost effective services.
241. See generally Spectrum Report, supra note 8, at 9634-36 (reporting that the Com-
mission does not estimate the value of auctionable spectrum and that mandated competi-
tive bidding that awards licenses to those who will pay the most for them satisfies the con-
gressional objectives enacted in section 3090) of the FCA).
242. NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 54-55 (establishing that the bankruptcy court's reduc-
tion of NextWave's bid obligation effectively awarded licenses to a company that the FCC
determined was not a worthy licensee). Congress assigned the FCC as the expert in allo-
cating spectrum, and together they decided that marketplace forces would indicate which
licensees would best serve the PCS market. See id.; e.g., Heather Forsgren Weaver, Con-
gress Could Step in to Guide C-Block, RCR RADIO COMM. REP., Sept. 21, 1998, at 3 (re-
porting on Rep. John Dingell's reaction to a ruling in GWI's C-Block bankruptcy case).
Representative Dingell found it ironic that a bankruptcy judge in Dallas had a better sense
of the auction policies than the FCC. Id.
243. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 59-62.
244. See H.R. REP. 103-111, at 248 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 575
(suggesting to replace the lottery system of spectrum allocation with the competitive bid-
ding auctions due to the arbitrary and ineffective results of the former).
245. 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)(C), (4)(E) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
246. See generally H.R. REP. 103-111, at 249, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 576;
Senate Hearing, supra note 25 (statement of FCC Chairman William Kennard) (testifying
before the Senate Budget Committee that the FCC's position in the C-Block bankruptcy
litigation is motivated by strong public policy objectives).
247. See Jeffrey Silva and Heather Forsgren Weaver, FCC, DO]: Pocket Licenses Must
Come Back, RCR RADIO COMM. REP., Oct. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21947866, at
*3. FCC Chairman William Kennard stated that:
"Spectrum belongs to the American public. We should not allow valuable spec-
trum to be tied up for years in bankruptcy litigation .... If these auction winners
remain able to use the Bankruptcy Code to avoid the amount they promised to
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NextWave contends that the protection afforded by the Bankruptcy
Code is crucial, not only to its own companies and creditors, but to the
public interest at large.248 Allowing the FCC to evade bankruptcy law
without express congressional authority can chill public and private fi-
nancing for future telecommunications ventures.249 Similarly, allowing
such behavior also revokes the safety net of bankruptcy law upon which
all financial entities have the right to rely.25° Denying bankruptcy relief
for NextWave sends a strong message to the telecommunications indus-
try that entrepreneurial companies may be effectively precluded from en-
tering the wireless marketplace.
Despite contentions, the NextWave IX ruling's most important result
will be the restored integrity of congressional intent and FCC author-
ity.252 The bankruptcy court's failure to grasp the obvious regulatory role
of enforcing the payment conditions completely ignored the purpose of
awarding spectrum licenses by auction. By allowing the FCC to reclaim
the licenses, the market forces upon which consumers, the government,
and commercial providers rely will continue to be the drive behind a
healthy and successful telecommunications industry.253
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted both the Federal Communications Act and the
pay the American government and keep the licenses out of productive use, then
consumers lose on both ends .... American taxpayers should not have to bear
the risk when entrepreneurs try to back out of their promises to the govern-
ment."
Id. (quoting FCC Chairman William Kennard).
248. See NextWave Statement, supra note 25 (declaring that by reclaiming the
NextWave licenses, the FCC will severely impact and irreparably harm bankrupt C-Block
licensees across the country, and will inevitably cause a delay of PCS service to the public).
249. See Shrier-Rape & Brookner, supra note 95, at 7.
250. See id. at 8 (illustrating that government instrumentalities are subject to the Code
when dealing with private entities).
251. See H.R. Rep. 103-111, at 254-55, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 581-82; In re
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 270 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(NextWave VIII) (arguing that NextWave would have to be liquidated and sold if it cannot
retain the licenses, therefore resulting in a $420 million loss for its investors). NextWave
also warned that stripping the company of its rights under bankruptcy law would set a de-
structive precedent for other areas of industry where the government acts as a creditor.
See NextWave Petitions Supreme Court for Review, WASH. TELECOM NEWSWIRE, June 9,
2000, available in 2000 WL 6837355.
252. In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 129, 141 (2d Cir. 2000) (NextWave IX), petition for cert.
filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2000) (No. 00-447).
253. See Senate Hearing, supra note 25 (statement of FCC Chairman William Ken-
nard) (listing the benefits to consumers and the industry in a market driven auction proc-
ess).
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Bankruptcy Code to satisfy economic policy goals that are inherent in
our capitalist society. Ignoring these goals would produce unintended
inequities and inefficiencies. So too would a ruling that denies the court
or the FCC its proper authority under both areas of law. According to
these principles, the Second Circuit in NextWave successfully reconciled
the laws when it affirmed the Commission's right to enforce spectrum
payment obligations and penalties by virtue of the agency's regulatory
authority. A contrary ruling would allow NextWave to avoid the law
governing the allocation of spectrum licenses and rendered useless the
entire auction program. Such a consequence would have undeniably
been contrary to the public interest.
Catholic University Law Review
